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What's Left Standing? FECA Citizen Suits and
the Battle for Judicial Review
Kimberly N. Brown'
I.

INTRODUCTION

It has long been argued that the prevailing standard for ensuring that
courts adjudicate "Cases or Controversies" within the meaning of Article
III of the Constitution I is as flawed as it is fundamental. Applied most
prominently in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlije,2 the reigning test for
standing to bring suit in federal court turns foremost on whether
plaintiffs have suffered a particularized injury.3 It reflects the belief that
courts are constrained to hearing citizens' individualized complaints, and
that so-called "generalized grievances" shared by the populace are not
constitutionally cognizable even if Congress explicitly granted standing
to vindicate them. Lujan consequently invalidated an explicit statutory
grant of standing4 to generic "citizens" on Article III grounds. s
"Vindicating the public interest," Justice Scalia wrote, "is the function of
Congress and the Chief Executive.,,6
Like the statute at issue in Lujan, the Federal Election Commission
Act (FECA) 7 is relatively unusual legislation because Congress did not
• Associate Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma College of Law. The author wishes to
thank Sandra Ahn, John Beckerman, Joe Birkenstock, Lyn Entzeroth, Steve Gensler, Michele
Gilman, Katheleen Guzman, Leslie Kelleher, Peter Krug, Edith Marshall, Harry Schwirck, Murray
Tabb, Peter Tague, and Chris Brooks Whitman for comments on prior drafts of this Article. The
Campaign Legal Center in Washington, D.C., provided valuable research assistance.
I. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (stating that judicial power extends to certain types of cases
and controversies).
2. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
3. Id. at 560; see also Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S.
167,181 (2000) (articulating standard and citing Lujan).
4. Endangered Species Act of 1973,16 U.S.C. § I 540(g)(I) (2000).
5. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The Court's holding that there is an
outer limit to the power of Congress to confer rights of action is a direct and necessary consequence
of the case and controversy limitations found in Article 111."); see also Cass R. Sunstein, What's
Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REv. 163, 165
(1992) (citing Lujan as prompting "invalidation of an explicit congressional grant of standing to
'citizens"').
6. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576.
7. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-456 (2000); see also infra note
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confine its enforcement to the Federal Election Commission (FEC or
Commission), but included a provision enabling a private person to sue
the FEC in federal court to compel enforcement of the law against a third
party. 8 The Supreme Court sustained the express reach of the FECA's
citizen-suit provision in FEe v. Akins,9 which, in the words of Cass R.
Sunstein, "is by far the most important pronouncement on the general
issue of standing to obtain information ... [because] the Court appears to
have held that any citizen has standing to sue under FECA."IO
Despite the ostensible scope of Akins, the question of whether any
party has standing to sue the FEC under the FECA's citizen-suit
provision continues to be relitigated. By relying on Lujan and its
progeny, the FEC has repeatedly disavowed federal courts' jurisdiction
to hear challenges to its preinvestigation dismissals of administrative
complaints, not only defying the Supreme Court's pronouncement in
Akins, but effectively seeking immunity from such judicial review.
This Article discusses standing to sue the FEC with two principal
objectives. First, it attempts to frame the doctrinal inconsistencies
between Lujan and Akins that have given rise to ongoing FECA standing
litigation and concludes that the Supreme Court should acknowledge its
repudiation of Lujan in cases seeking election-related information.
Second, it explores the question whether courts may be statutorily
required to consider citizen challenges to FEC enforcement actions as a
matter of justiciability theory in the first instance, and concludes that
courts should tum to the oft-overlooked Akins decision in lieu of Lujan in
reviewing suits brought under citizen-suit statutes generally. II
69 (summarizing the FECA's main provisions).
8. See id. § 437g(a)(8) (stating that an aggrieved party may file a petition if the FEC dismisses
a complaint or fails to act on a complaint within the stated time period); see also Chamber of
Commerce of the U.S. v. FEC, 69 F.3d 600, 603 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (characterizing statute as "unusual
in that it permits a private party to challenge the FEC's decision not to enforce").
9. See 524 U.S. II, 19-26 (1998) (holding that voters have standing to bring suit against the
FEC for not bringing an enforcement action when they were unable to obtain information the FECA
allegedly required be made public).
10. Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and
Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REv. 613, 616 (1999) (citing Akins). Professor Sunstein remarked in 1999
that, "[r]emarkably, the emerging law governing standing to obtain information has yet to receive
academic attention." Id. This statement remains accurate today.
II. Interestingly, in Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007), a 5-4 majority of the
Supreme Court recently found that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts had standing to sue the
EPA to prompt a rulemaking to address global warming. Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens
appeared to adopt an Akins-like theory of justiciability in a generalized grievance context. See id. at
1456 (quoting Akins). Chief Justice Roberts vigorously dissented and was joined by Justice Scalia,
the author of the plurality decision in Lujan. See id. at 1464 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (quoting
Lujan). Although the majority opinion is most notable for its apparent endowment of "special
solicitude" to States in Article III standing analysis, Justice Stevens's reliance on Akins for the
proposition that the fact "[t]hat the[] climate-change risks are 'widely-shared' does not minimize
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Part II reviews Akins and highlights its subtle but dramatic
departures from the premises of Lujan. Upholding Congress's power to
define injury in the FECA itself, the Akins Court largely dispensed with
the causation and redressability requirements but failed to expressly
negate conflicting aspects of Lujan. This fundamental inconsistency
between Akins and Lujan has enabled relitigation of Akins itself in cases
brought against the FEC.
Part III develops the theoretical underpinnings of the Akins's
viewpoint that, although there must be limits on the power of Congress
to define the scope of Article III standing, the case-or-controversy
requirement should be interpreted as empowering Congress to legislate
standing in some measure to spur executive enforcement activity. This
Part considers standing under the FECA's citizen-suit provision in
particular as a mechanism for enforcement of the federal campaign and
election laws, and concludes that Congress's use of such power seems
reasonable and circumscribed.
Part IV attempts to reconcile Lujan and Akins and their competing
theoretical bases. Lujan does not faithfully remain the cohesive force in
public law in' any event. Rather than uniformly tamping down on
attempts to vindicate generalized grievances, Supreme Court and lowercourt decisions reflect a recognition that the nature of administrative
decision making necessarily provokes merits adjudication of less-thanindividualized challenges to Executive Branch activity. Courts should
therefore resist the FEC's invitation to revert to a strict Lujan application
of injury-in-fact. This Article proposes that courts apply Akins as
creating per se standing in FECA cases seeking information, and
consider its expansion to cases involving FECA-like citizen-suit statutes
to the degree that the applicable substantive law of agency review
already affords substantial deference on the merits. The result of this
more objective standing inquiry would be litigation for the sake of
shedding light on government conduct-a readily defensible democratic
goal.
II. THE STANDING PROBLEM: "LWANV. AKINS"
The prevailing test for Article III standing, applied in Lujan, has long
been the subject of ardent critique. Although numerous scholars have

Massachusetts' interest in the outcome of this litigation" raises questions as to the future of standing
doctrine in public law cases implicating so-called generalized grievances. Id. at 1455, 1456
(majority opinion) (quoting Akins, 524 U.s. at 24).
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proposed substitute standing tests, few have carefully examined the
Supreme Court's own reworking of Lujan in the Akins case. 12
Both Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife and FEe v. Akins were brought
under express statutory provisions authorizing suit to challenge agency
inaction. Although the Supreme Court purported to apply the identical
standard for Article III standing in both, it reached precisely opposite
results. This Part concludes that although Akins shifted the injury-in-fact
paradigm from the facts relating to plaintiff to the statutory creation of
injury, its inherent analytical conflict with Lujan has enabled the FEC to
challenge anyone's standing to sue it under the FECA. As a result, Akins
has been relitigated repeatedly, and whether Akins controls any plaintiffs
standing has been called into question. Were courts to properly
recognize that Akins and Lujan are not entirely reconcilable, redundant
standing litigation under the FECA's citizen-suit provision would cease.

A. The Prevailing Injury-in-Fact Test
1.

The Case-or-Controversy Requirement Encapsulated

Standing jurisprudence contains two strands: Article III standing to
sue,
which
enforces
the
Constitution's
case-or-controversy
requirement,13 and prudential standing, which embodies "judicially selfThe
imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction.,,14
constitutional limitation on standing, unlike the prudential one, cannot be
waived by parties or Congress. 15 Although the ban on "generalized
grievances" originated as a prudential, or judge-made, limitation on
standing,16 the Supreme Court has not consistently characterized the

12. See Sunstein, supra note 10, at 616 (stating that, "[r]emarkably, the emerging law
governing standing to obtain information has yet to receive academic attention,"-a statement that
largely applies today). But see William W. Buzbee, Standing and the Statutory Universe, II DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL'y F. 247, 262-63 (2001) (discussing the retreat from Lujan in Akins); Gene R.
Nichol, The Impossibility of Lujan 's Project, II DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'y F. 193, 197-98 (2001)
(discussing standing analysis in Akins and Lujan).
13. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (discussing federal court jurisdiction).
14. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). Although the Court has not exhaustively
defined the prudential dimensions of the standing doctrine, it has explained that prudential standing
encompasses three elements: (I) "the general prohibition on a litigant's raising another person's
legal rights," (2) "the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately
addressed in the representative branches," and (3) "the requirement that a plaintiff's complaint fall
within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked." Id.
IS. See Gladstone, Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, \00 (1979) (observing that,
although Congress may legislatively override prudential standing limits, it may not abrogate Article
III minima).
16. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 490-91 (1975) (declaring that bar on citizen and
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generalized grievance restriction as such; in Lujan, the plurality
construed it as part-and-parcel of the case-or-controversy requirement, 17
a nuance that has erupted in confusion post-Akins. 18
Article III itself does not attempt to define "Case" or "Controversy"
or provide any guidelines as to what sorts of disputes are appropriately
resolved through the judicial process. As the Supreme Court has
observed, "an executive inquiry can bear the name 'case' ... and a
legislative dispute can bear the name 'controversy. ",19 According to
James Madison's explanation at the Constitutional Convention, the
language limits judicial review "to cases of a Judiciary Nature.,,2o
Because "the Constitution's central mechanism of separation of powers
depends largely upon common understanding of what activities are
appropriate to legislatures, to executives, and to courts,,,21 by restricting
the availability of judicial review, standing promotes separation of
powers. Of course, whether something is "of a Judiciary Nature" or
"appropriate" for judicial review begs the question of whether a dispute
is justiciable under Article III. Translating the case-or-controversy
requirement into a single workable standard of justiciability has thus
been notoriously difficult for the Supreme Court.
Historically, the Court analogized Article III standing to the common
law by looking to whether the defendant's actions harmed a legal interest
recognized at common law. 22
Because the modem citizenry's
relationship with the federal government and its administrative apparatus
has no corollary under the common law system,23 this method had
inherent limitations. The Supreme Court moved in the 1960s and early
1970s toward the current standard by looking to whether the plaintiff has
taxpayer suits was "prudential").
17. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 94 (4th ed. 2003) (discussing Lujan
holding).
18. See FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11,23 (\ 998) ("Whether styled as a constitutional or prudential
limit on standing, the Court has sometimes determined that where large numbers of Americans
suffer alike, the political process, rather than the judicial process, may provide the more appropriate
remedy for a widely shared grievance." (citing cases)).
19. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559 (\992).
20. Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Injury and the DiSintegration of Article Ill, 74 CAL. L. REv. 1915,
1919 (\ 986) (quoting 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 430 (Max Ferrand
ed., rev. ed. 1966».
2\' Lujan, 504 U.S. at 559--60.
22. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, at 68--69 (citing Tenn. Elec. Power Co. v. Tenn. Valley
Auth., 306 U.S. 118, 137-38 (\939)); Nichol, supra note 20, at 1920 (citing Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 151-53 (\951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
23. See Nichol, supra note 20, at 1920--21 (noting that the "[g]overnment owes substantial
duties and obligations to its citizenry that have no clear counterparts in the common law system" and
that "[I]iberalized judicial review of administrative decisionmaking also led to a fatal collision with
the purely private rights model").
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a particular stake in the outcome of the litigation, regardless of the nature
of the abstract claim.24 Justice Brennan explained in Baker v. Carr that
"a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy ... assure[s] that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.,,25 Whether a federal judge's authority is at its
essence limited to resolving purely private disputes akin to those at
common law remains a hotly disputed question that has shaped the
Supreme Court's justiciability jurisprudence ever since.
Although the first iterations of what is now known as the "injury-infact" standard expanded plaintiffs' access to the federal courts by
recognizing injuries well beyond the economic harm that was the
cornerstone of the common law system,26 under Chief Justice Warren
Burger, the Court reconfigured the standard to substantially narrow the
range of justiciable claims by requiring that plaintiffs show that the
injury is "distinct"-i.e., differentiated from the general populace-and
"palpable" or "concrete," as opposed to speculative or hypothetical. 27
The modem test requires that plaintiffs show (a) that they have suffered
an "injury-in-fact" that was (b) caused by the defendant and that would
(c) be redressable by a judgment in their favor as prerequisites to
invoking the jurisdiction of an Article III court. 28 Moreover, "a plaintiff
must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought,,29
and with the quantum of proof required at each stage of the litigation?O
Two factors further complicate the injury-in-fact test in cases
brought against a governmental entity. First, if the plaintiff himself is the
24. See id. at 1921 & n.36 (citing Ass'n of Data Processing Servo Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150, 154 (1970)) (reviewing some examples of abstract interests that might, if harmed, establish
injury, as provided by the Court in Data Processing).
25. 369 U.S. 186,204 (1962). See generally Daniel Patrick Condon, Note, The Generalized
Grievance Restriction: Prudential Restraint or Constitutional Mandate?, 70 GEO. L.J. 1157, 116465 ( 1982) (discussing !be purpose of the personal stake requirement).
26. Nichol, supra note 20, at 1921.
27. See id. at 1923 ("[T]he injury standard demands harm that is 'distinct and palpable.'"
(quoting Warth V. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, SOl (1975))).
28. Lujan V. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). The standing requirements
for suing in state courts may vary significantly. See ROGER BEERS, STANDING AND RIGHTS OF
ACTION IN ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION 5 (ALI-ABA Coursebook Paper, 2005), available at
SK094 ALI-ABA (Westlaw) (discussing cases).
29. Friends of the Earth, Inc. V. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000).
30. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. Thus, "[a]t the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury
resulting from the defendant's conduct may suffice," but "[i]n response to a summary judgment
motion, ... the plaintiff can no longer rest on such 'mere allegations,' but must 'set forth' by
affidavit or other evidence 'specific facts. '" ld. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)). At the final stage,
controverted facts "must be 'supported adequately by the evidence adduced at trial. '" ld. (quoting
Gladstone, Realtors V. ViiI. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91,115 n.31 (1979)).
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subject of the government action, it is usually clear that he has been
injured and that a favorable judgment will redress the injury.3l If the
asserted injury stems from the government's regulation or lack of
regulation of someone else, by contrast, "much more is needed.,,32
Second, a handful of federal statutes-primarily those governing federal
environmental law-expressly confer standing on "any person,"
"citizen," or "party" to challenge agency actions?3 Although technically
a plaintiff must independently satisfy the Lujan standard in cases brought
pursuant to such statutes, citizen-suit provisions complicate the standing
analysis by provoking the ban on generalized grievances. They represent
a congressional determination to empower citizens to bring about a
change in the way the Executive is enforcing the law. But in theory if
injury-in-fact is truly a constitutional mandate, Congress has no power to
endow the citizenry with standing to sue the FEC to prompt it to take
enforcement action against a third party. Citizen-suit statutes thus
highlight an inherent tension between the particularized injury
requirement and standing to sue in many public law cases, a tension that
is readily apparent in analyzing the various opinions in Lujan and Akins.
2. Lujan and Statutory Standing
Lujan involved a nonprofit organization's challenge to a rule
promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior that interpreted the
Endangered Species Act (ESA)34 so as to render the statute inapplicable
to government actions taken abroad. 35 The ESA instructs the Secretary
to promulgate by regulation a list of threatened species and to define
their critical habitats. 36 It then requires that each federal agency, "in
consultation with and with the assistance of the Secretary, insure that any
action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency ... is not likely
31. Jd. at 561-62.
32. Jd. at 562.
33. E.g., Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(8)(A) (2000); Toxic
Substances Control Act § 119, 15 U.S.c. § 2619(a) (2000); Endangered Species Act § II, 16 U.S.c.
§ I 540(g) (2000); Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act § 520,30 U.S.C. § 1270(a) (2000);
Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 505, 33 U.S.c. § 1365(a) (2000); Deepwater Port Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1515(a) (2000); Safe Water Drinking Act § 1449,42 U.S.C. § 300j-8 (2000); Noise Control
Act § 12,42 U.S.c. § 4911(a) (2000); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act § 702,42 U.S.c. §
6972(a) (2000); Clean Air Act § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (2000); Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act, 43 U.S.c. § 1349(a) (2000). The bulk of citizen-suit statutes appear in environmental
legislation. See BEERS, supra note 28, at 2 ("[M]ost environmental statutes or amendments enacted
after the Clean Air Act in 1970 contain such citizen suit provisions. ").
34. 87 Stat. 884 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.c. §§ 1531-1544 (2000)).
35. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 557-58.
36. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1533, 1536.
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to jeopardize the continued existence" of those species or their habitats. 37
In 1978, the Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries
Service promulgated a regulation extending these obligations to actions
taken in foreign nations, but proposed a revised regulation in 1983 that
required only consultation for actions taken in the United States or on the
38
high seas.
The ESA contains a citizen-suit provision, which provides in
pertinent part that "any person may commence a civil suit on his own
behalf ... to enjoin any person ... who is alleged to be in violation of
any provision of this chapter.,,39 A group of organizations devoted to
environmental causes sued the Secretary, seeking a declaratory judgment
that the new regulation was erroneous and an injunction requiring
40
reinstatement of the old one. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff
groups lacked standing because they failed to show that any members
were individually harmed with sufficient particularity or imminence. 41
"By particularized," Justice Scalia wrote for the majority, "we mean that
the injury must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.,,42
In an attempt to link the environmental threat to an actual
personalized stake or interest in the judgment sought, the plaintiffs
claimed that the agencies' lack of consultation regarding activities
abroad increased the rate of extinction of endangered and threatened
species, and that members of the plaintiff organizations had traveled to
Egypt and Sri Lanka and observed endangered species in their traditional
habitats, and intended to retum. 43 The plaintiffs' alleged injury was thus
grounded in a procedural right created by virtue of the statute's
requirement that agencies entrusted with the ESA's enforcement consult
with each other regarding the impact of their actions on threatened
species or habitats. 44 The Court found it not cognizable irrespective of
the statute's citizen-suit provision because the plaintiffs could not show
how damage to the species injured them personally.45 They produced no

37. Id. § 1536(a)(2).
38. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 558-59 (citations omitted).
39. 16 u.s.c. § I 540(g)(2000).
40. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 559.
41. Id. at 564.
42. Id. at 560 n.l. As noted previously, this requirement dovetails with the prudential
limitation on standing that precludes individual lawsuits to avenge "generalized grievances" shared
by the populace as a whole.
43. Id. at 562-64 (quotations and citations omitted).
44. Id. at 562-63.
45. Id. at 563.
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concrete plans to visit the habitats in the future. 46 Although the ESA
required interagency consultation and empowered citizens to sue for its
enforcement, the Lujan Court flatly rejected the notion "that the injuryin-fact requirement had been satisfied by congressional conferral upon
all persons of an abstract, self-contained, non instrumental 'right' to have
the Executive observe the procedures required by law.,,47 The Court
acknowledged that individuals can enforce procedural rights, but only if
the procedures were "designed to protect some threatened concrete
interest" of theirs that would independently give rise to standing. 48 Thus,
the inquiry circled back to particularized injury, regardless of the "right"
to a particular procedure created by statute. 49
Although the Supreme Court had previously recognized
congressional power to create justiciable statutory rights even if no
cognizable injury existed prelegislation,50 Lujan defeats the notion that
Congress can legislate self-executing standing to the citizenry overall to
vindicate such rights. Congress can only go so far, in other words, in
exercising its settled authority to create justiciable statutory "rights" and
in enhancing the justiciability of those rights with attendant citizen-suit
prOVISIOns.
A plurality of the Court further concluded that the Lujan plaintiffs
failed to satisfy the causation and redressability prongs. Justice Scalia
deemed challenges to government programs, even if premised on
violations of federal law, "'rarely if ever appropriate for federal-court
adjudication. ",51 Because the funding agencies were not parties to the
suit, whether a judgment against the Secretary would redress the alleged
injury was "entirely conjectural.,,52
Thus, while Lujan stands for the proposition that Congress cannot
legislatively override the constitutional injury-in-fact requirement to

46. Id. at 564.
47. Id. at 573.
48. Id. at 573 n.8; see also Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26,41 n.22 (1976)
("When Congress has so acted, the requirements of Art. III remain: '(T)he plaintiff still must allege a
distinct and palpable injury to himself, even if it is an injury shared by a large class of other possible
litigants. ", (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975))).
49. Although there is arguably a distinction between abstract procedural rights and the right to
information in that the latter produces a concrete, tangible commodity, the Akins Court found that
the plaintiffs' injury lay in the "inability to obtain information," not in the void created by the
absence of the information at issue. FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11,21 (1998).
50. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, at 70 (discussing Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409
U.S. 205 (1972)).
51. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 568 (plurality opinion) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 759-60
(1984)).
52. Id. at 568, 571.
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enable citizens to challenge government programs, the plurality indicated
that causation and redressability are defeated whenever the actions of
third parties could hypothetically interfere with the plaintiffs ability to
achieve precise redress of the individualized relief alleged (if any) in
administrative cases. The implications of Lujan practically translate into
a ban on any suit against a government agency that does not involve
clean challenges to regulatory activity by the regulated. In the latter
circumstance, the case can easily be made that the government regulator
directly caused the injury alleged by the regulated party. In more
attenuated cases, such as those in which plaintiffs seek Executive
enforcement of the campaign finance laws, the ultimate target is not even
a party to the action; strict redressability, therefore, is utterly illusory.
3. The Failures ofInjury-in-Fact
The Supreme Court's attempt to fashion a bright-line test that keeps
federal judges from improperly usurping the Executive authority is
laudable.
The case-or-controversy language surely implies that
something short of a political dispute must exist before the judiciary can
be involved. 53 Whether the injury-in-fact test effectively keeps courts
from adjudicating noncases or noncontroversies within the meaning of
Article III, however, is less evident. The Court has observed that the test
"in no way depends on the merits of the plaintiffs contention,,,54 thus
appearing to have assumed that it is sufficiently divorced from the merits
to foster objectivity uninfluenced by a judge's political persuasions or the
"sexiness" of the case. 55 Yet the test's susceptibility to whim and
subjectivity is perhaps the loudest complaint lodged against it.
Joined by Justice O'Connor, Justice Blackmun dissented in Lujan
because the facts submitted raised at least a "genuine issue" as to
whether the plaintiff organizations' members would return to the sites
abroad as averred in their affidavits, which is all that the summary
judgment standard of Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 requires; the dissent thus
questioned the plurality's requirement of "concrete plans" as "empty
formality.,,56 Nothing prevented the affiants from "simply purchasing

53. Cj Nichol, supra note 20, at 1923 ("The Court's goals ... are both ascertainable and ...
laudable.").
54. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975).
55. See Nichol, supra note 20, at 1923-24 (discussing the "line of demarcation between the
presentation of 'cases' and the mere airing of political disagreements").
56. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 592 (Blackmun, 1., dissenting).
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plane tickets.,,57 Justice Blackmun "fear[ed] the Court's demand for
detailed descriptions of future conduct will do little to weed out those
who are genuinely harmed from those who are not," and require "more
and more particularized showings of future harm.,,58
The concerns Justice Blackmun outlined were not idle. Requiring
the judiciary to employ a standing inquiry that depends on an ultimately
subjective analysis of how much harm is enough harm yields more-not
less-power for unelected judges. As the varying opinions in Lujan
itself demonstrate, the injury-in-fact test enables judges to resolve
debates over whether affidavits are sufficiently detailed in wildly
disparate ways that may be equally legitimate under its three prongs. As
a result, case law under Lujan is fraught with inconsistencies. 59 The
injury-in-fact test tolerates the outcome-determinative standing
adjudication that it was designed to avoid, all the while bearing no
transparent correlation to the strength of the claim on the merits. A judge
could require a more particularized showing of harm if she prefers to
dismiss the case, and accept a vague showing if she wishes to reach the
merits. Hypothetically, too, injury-in-fact can easily be overcome by
recruiting "injured" plaintiffs to join a political organization's complaint
simply for purposes of surviving what would otherwise be a difficult
standing challenge to an overly broad attack on a government program. 60
The Supreme Court has rejected a quantitative test for injury,6! so the test
is both underinclusive (excluding legitimate claims based on pleading
technicalities) and potentially overinclusive.

57. Id.
58. Id. at 593.
59. See generally Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Standing Jor Privilege: The Failure oj Injury Analysis,
82 B.U. L. REV. 301 (2002) (discussing how standing law is inconsistent). Many have taken the
view that "as a body oflaw, the standing doctrine has failed," id. at 304, both because the standard is
inherently flawed and inflexible by design, and because the Supreme Court has interpreted its
creation too restrictively. See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review oj Agency Inaction: An
Arbitrariness Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657, 1671 (2004) (explaining the disappointment due
to the Supreme Court's restrictive interpretation of the injury-in-fact requirement).
60. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, at 62 (describing how, after the Supreme Court
determined in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), that the Sierra Club lacked standing to
sue to prevent the construction of a ski resort because there was no allegation that its members had
used the area where the resort was to be constructed, Justice White is quoted as saying, '''Why didn't
the Sierra Club have one goddamn member walk through the park and then there would have been
standing to sue?'''; the plaintiffs amended their complaint accordingly on remand (quoting BOB
WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 164 n* (1979»).
61. Steven G. Davison, Standing to Sue in Citizen Suits Against Air and Water Polluters Under
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 17 TuL. ENVTL. L.J. 63,
66 & n.21 (2003) (citing United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412
U.S. 669, 689 n.14 (\973».
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Proposed alternatives to the injury-in-fact standard range from a
straightforward merits test62 to a redefinition of injury to recognize
subcategories of cognizable interests63 to, perhaps most prominently, a
purely statutory inquiry hinging on congressional intent. 64 Others have
challenged these critiques by attempting to unearth' the historical
underpinnings of the Constitution's case-or-controversy requirement,
arguing that the Framers envisioned the federal courts as places for
hearing actual and distinctly personal grievances, and that Lujan properly
(if not clumsily) aims to cabin their role in our structure of government. 65
Whether Congress can legislate standing to sue has been at the heart
of this dialogue. 66 Nowhere is this question more salient than where
review of government action is concerned. We live in an era of
extraordinary tension regarding the powers of Congress vis-a-vis the
autonomy of the Executive Branch. Whether private citizens can invoke
the jurisdiction of the third branch of government, at Congress's behest,
to review Executive action is a question with everyday implications. It is
particularly salient in the area of campaign finance and election reform,
which many view as striking at the heart of democracy itself. Because it
provides that Congress can endow citizens with standing to sue the FEC
to prompt it to enforce the law, the Supreme Court's decision in FEe v.
Akins67 is of greater import than has been recognized.

62. See William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE LJ. 221, 234 (1988) (stating
that "standing is a jurisdictional question, involving a preliminaI)' look at the merits").
63. See Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Rethinking Standing, 72 CAL. L. REv. 68, 89 (1984) (stating three
ways an interest cognizable by law can be created); see also Nichol, supra note 20, at 1942-43
(arguing that injury should take into account the cognizability of the underlying interest in addition
to the actuality of the hann).
64. See Sunstein, supra note 10, at 616-17 (noting "the question of standing is for
congressional rather than judicial resolution").
65. See generally James Leonard & Joanne C. Brant, The Half-Open Door: Article III, the
Injury-in-Fact Rule, and the Framers' Plan for Federal Courts of Limited Jurisdiction, 54 RUTGERS
L. REv. I (2001) (reviewing the evolution of the injuI)'-in-fact requirement and arguing that it
reflects the Framers' views); Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing
Doctrine?, 102 MICH. L. REv. 689 (2004) (arguing that historically cases saw a "constitutional
dimension to standing doctrine").
66. Justice Scalia framed the same question as "whether the public interest ... in agencies'
observance of a particular, statutorily prescribed procedure can be converted into an individual right
by a statute that denominates it as such, and that pennits all citizens ... to sue." Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576-77 (1992) (punctuation omitted).
67. 524 U.S. II (1998).
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B. Informational Injury and FEC v. Akins
Akins addressed the question of whether individual voters'
challenges to the FEC's refusal to take enforcement action against
someone else presented a case or controversy within the meaning of
Article III. In finding standing, the Court drew three conclusions in
derogation of Lujan. First, it indicated that Congress can create a
statutory "right" that the populace can enforce in court by sheer
operation of the statute. Second, it lifted the ban on Article III courts'
adjudication of grievances that are widely shared so long as the harm
itself is not "abstract." And, third, it diluted the causation and
redressability requirements beyond reasonable recognition. Yet the full
implications of Akins have only marginally been explored. 68
Akins arose from the Commission's determination that the American
Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) is not a "political committee"
as defined by the FECA and its refusal to require AlP AC to make
disclosures required under the Act. 69 A group of voters that opposed
AIPAC's views filed a complaint with the FEC alleging that AIPAC was
a political committee that failed to comply with the FECA's disclosure
requirements. It asked the FEC to force AlP AC to release information
required of political committees. 7o

68. See also Nichol, supra note 59, at 336 ("[I]n Federal Election Commission v. Akins, the
Court backed away from Lujan's premises. In Akins, the Court easily recognized a statutory grant of
standing even though some Justices would have regarded the informational claim asserted as a
generalized grievance."); cf Trevor W. Morrison, Private Attorneys General and the First
Amendment, 103 MICH. L. REv. 589,624 n.158 (2005) ("Applied broadly, this approach might seem
to signal a repudiation of Lujan's conception of 'injury in fact. "').
69. As the Supreme Court explained in Akins, "the FECA seeks to remedy any actual or
perceived corruption of the political process in several important ways." 524 U.S. at 14. The FECA
prohibits corporations from making contributions or expenditures in connection with elections to any
political office, including primary elections. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (2000). It imposes limits on the
amounts individuals and entities qualifYing as "political committees" under the Act can contribute or
spend in coordination with a candidate for federal political office. [d. §§ 441a(a)-(b), 44lb. A
"political committee" includes "any committee, club, association or other group of persons" which
receives more than $\000 in "contributions" or makes more than $\000 in "expenditures" in any
given year, 2 U.S.C. § 431(4)(A) (2000), "for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal
office," id. § 431(8)(A)(i), (9)(A)(i). Political committees must register with the Commission,
appoint a treasurer, maintain information regarding contributors, track disbursements, and file
periodic reports setting forth this and other information in great detail. [d. §§ 432-434.
70. Akins, 524 U.S. at 15-16. The FEC concluded that A1PAC's communications did count as
"expenditures" for purposes of the FECA's definition of "political committee," but nonetheless
exempted AIPAC from its requirements and dismissed the voters' complaint. [d. at 17-18,29. The
district court and the D.C. Circuit ultimately reached the merits, finding that the FEC misinterpreted
the statute's definition of "political committee." See Akins v. FEC, 101 F.3d 731,744 (D.C. Cir.
1996) (en banc) (finding that the FEC's decision to dismiss appellant's complaint was "based on its
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In finding that the plaintiffs had standing to sue the FEC for refusing
to take enforcement action against AIPAC, Justice Breyer, writing for the
majority, unambiguously recognized Congress's power to define
constitutional standing: 71 "[T]he informational injury at issue here,
directly related to voting, the most basic of political rights, is sufficiently
concrete and specific" so as not to "deprive Congress of constitutional
power to authorize its vindication in the federal courts."n Because the
FECA required the disclosure of information, the deprivation of such
information established standing. 73 This holding presupposes that
Congress is empowered to legislate an "injury" previously unknown to
the law. The Court rejected the FEC's argument "that Congress lacks the
constitutional power to authorize federal courts to adjudicate this
lawsuit.,,74
The Akins approach to congressional power to define justiciability
stands in stark contrast with that reflected in Lujan, which hinged
standing analysis on the individual's private injury as distinct from the
statutory terms that gave rise to the injury.75 In Lujan, Justice Scalia
made clear that "[i]t makes no difference" what Congress attempts to do
by way of legislation when it comes to Article III standing-the
Constitution always requires injury-in-fact. 76 The Akins majority, by
contrast, based its standing inquiry on the purpose of the FECA's
enforcement provision, and refused to accept the proposition-implicit in

mistaken interpretation of § 43 1(4)(A)"), rev 'd on other grounds, 524 U.S. 11 (1998).
71. Justice Breyer observed that the prudential standing element is satisfied because Congress
empowered "'[a]ny party aggrieved'" by the FEC's dismissal of an administrative complaint or its
failure to timely act on such a complaint to sue in district court. Akins, 524 U.S. at 19 (quoting §
437g(a)(8)(A) (2000)) (alteration in original). Justice Breyer construed this language as evincing "a
congressional intent to cast the standing net broadly." Id. at 19-20 (citing the Administrative
Procedure Act which states that "those 'suffering legal wrong' or 'adversely affected or aggrieved ..
. within the meaning of a relevant statute' may seek judicial review of agency action"); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,66-67 (1976). Courts have interpreted the Akins Court's characterization of the
"aggrieved party" language as holding that Congress waives all prudential limitations on standing
except for the "zone of interest" test when it grants "aggrieved" parties the right to sue. See, e.g.,
Bangura v. Hansen, 434 F.3d 487, 499 (6th Cir. 2006) (discussing the application of the "zone of
interest test" as it applies to parties with standing to sue).
72. Akins, 524 U.S. at 24-25.
73. Id. at 25.
74. Id. at 20.
75. See Nichol, supra note 59, at 334 (arguing that the Court's "effort to make the injury
requirement a principal determinant" of the federal courts' limited role in our government has "not
succeeded," and that the opinions are "inconsistent and contradictory").
76. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 566 (1992) ("[I]t makes no difference
that the general-purpose section of the ESA states that the Act was intended in part 'to provide a
means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species depend may
be conserved."') (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1990)).
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the FEC's arguments and Justice Scalia's dissent-that the statute itself
is ultra vires.
Whereas the Lujan plurality rejected the plaintiffs' argument that
they suffered a generalized but justiciable "procedural injury" under the
ESA's citizen-suit provisions,77 the Akins Court again diverted from
Lujan by defeating the FEC's contention that the voters raised only a
"'generalized grievance. ",78 The fact that informational injury inflicted
on voters "is widely shared [does] not deprive Congress of constitutional
power to authorize its vindication in the federal courtS.,,79 The Court
distinguished harms of "an abstract and indefinite nature," such as
"injury to the interest in seeing that the law is obeyed.,,80
The Akins Court thus sketched out some sort of compromise between
a purely ideological injury that is not cognizable and one that, though
widely shared, is something more concrete than pure ideology, albeit not
particularized. At both poles, the grievance is "generalized" in the sense
that many people share it, so the constitutional objection under Akins lies
in the nature of the injury.8l Pure distaste in government activity
presumably still has a uniquely political solution post-Akins. Short of
that, Congress can define "injuries" that are cognizable notwithstanding
that the public as a whole suffers them. The Article III injury
requirement is satisfied so long as the plaintiff identifies injurypotentially any injury-to an express statutory "right.,,82 And in the
FECA, Congress created just such a nonabstract injury in establishing a
right to third-party information. The breadth of the citizen-suit provision
expressly allowing for standing to vindicate such statutory injury,
moreover, waives any prudential objections that might remain regarding
citizen standing. 83
Notably, Akins did not superimpose Lujan on FECA standing by
erecting what could have been a two-tiered injury standard, whereby a
complainant must prove both that it was denied access to information
and that such denial injured a live and specific interest in some
additional way (by, for example, making it difficult for a voter to
77. Id. at 573-74.
78. Akins, 524 U.S. at 23.
79. !d. at 25.
80. Jd. at 23-24.
81. See I LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 424 (3d ed. 2000) ("But a
court ... should not close its eyes to the nature of the substantive right asserted and should not forget
to inquire whether the nature of the particular injury, however widely inflicted, is such as to impede
the effective operation of majoritarian processes. ").
82. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, at 72.
83. See supra notes 14, 71 and accompanying text.
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evaluate a particular candidate implicated by the information in a
particular election).84
This is perhaps where the greatest
misunderstanding of the Akins holding lies. Courts and the FEC's
lawyers have added a layer of analysis on Akins that would require a
showing that a widely shared lack of FECA information also causes a
distinct, albeit related, harm to the plaintiff. 85 This is an understandable
attempt to harmonize Lujan's particularized injury requirement with
Akins, particularly as Lujan conflated the prudential ban on generalized
grievances (which Congress inherently waived with a citizen-suit
provision) with the Article III minima. But it is inconsistent with the
holding of Akins itself. Although the Court noted that there was "no
reason to doubt" that the information sought by AlP AC would be useful
to it,86 this comment was dicta and not integral to its finding of
constitutional standing.
The third and most prominent way in which Akins conflicted with
Lujan was its treatment of causation and redressability. AIPAC easily
cleared the hurdle that Justice Scalia described as "[t]he most obvious
problem" with Lujan. 87 Lujan established that a greater showing of
injury is needed when a plaintiff sues to prompt government regulation
of someone else. 88
Under such circumstances, causation and
redressability '''depend[] on the unfettered choices made by independent
actors not before the courts. ",89 Under Lujan, such plaintiffs must
"adduce facts showing that those choices have been or will be made in
such manner as to produce causation and permit redressability of
injury.,,9o In other words, plaintiffs must be prepared to establish "facts"
as to the occurrence of future events.
Akins presented the third-party scenario outlined in Lujan, with
opposite results. The Court was satisfied that the injury was redressable
even though the FEC was not in actual possession of the information
sought by AIPAC and thereby tolerated the inevitably speculative
causation and redressability showing that would otherwise constrain
plaintiffs seeking to spur regulation of a third party. Although the FEC
remained at leisure to "decide[] in the exercise of its discretion not to
require AIPAC to produce the information," this unknown did not defeat
84. Cf Akins, 524 U.S. at 21 (musing that "[t]here is no reason to doubt [the respondents']
claim that the information would help them ... in a specific election").
85. See infra notes 99-123 and accompanying text.
86. Akins, 524 U.S. at 21.
87. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 568, 571 (1992) (plurality opinion).
88. Id. at 562 (majority opinion).
89. Id. (quoting ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605,615 (1989) (plurality opinion)).
90. Id. (emphasis added).
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Article III causation. 91 The Court found that causation and redressability
were satisfied by the mere fact that a reviewing court was empowered to
"set aside the agency's action and remand the case.,,92 Taken to its
logical extreme, this finding would render causation and redressability
per se satisfied in all administrative cases. The fact that AlP AC was not
a party to the case but could conceivably take actions to frustrate
redressability did not even factor into the Court's analysis.
At bottom, what the Akins Court refused to do under the auspices of
Article III standing was render the FECA enforcement provision a
nullity. Although well-established precedent generally precludes judicial
review of Executive decisions not to enforce a statute,93 the Akins Court
distinguished the FECA as a statute that "explicitly indicates the
contrary.,,94 In his Akins dissent, consequently, Justice Scalia predictably
assailed "[t]he provision of law at issue in this case [a]s an extraordinary
one," because it empowers private parties to compel an agency to
regulate a third party.95 By making clear that it was not willing to
entertain a challenge to the "provision of law" itself, the Akins majority
grounded its standing decision in the language of that law instead of the
facts peculiar to the individual plaintiffs before it. In doing so, it
elevated Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Lujan, in which he reiterated
that Congress is empowered to define injuries that give rise to a cause of
action that did not exist at common law. 96
Thus, whereas Akins focused on the terms of the statute on the theory
that Congress can legislate standing by creating a "right" to information
91. Akins, 524 U.S. at 25 (citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402,410 (1971); Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967)).
92. Id.
93. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) ("This Court has recognized on several
occasions over many years that an agency's decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through
civil or criminal process, is a decision generally committed to an agency's absolute discretion. ").
94. Akins, 524 U.S. at 26.
95. Id. at 29-30 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
96. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,580 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see
also Morrison, supra note 68, at 624 n.158 ("Arguably, ... Akins may signal a shift in the direction
of Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Lujan, which did not go so far as to say that assessing
individualized 'injury in fact' is an entirely pre-legal exercise, but instead simply stressed that
Congress must speak clearly and carefully when creating enforceable legal rights .... ").
Lujan was one of several cases in the mid-to-Iate 1980s that halted a "move toward
liberalization of standing," that had begun in the 1960s and had had a "net effect of . . .
transform[ing] the APA standing provisions from a screen against bystander suits into an open
sieve." Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1039, \077, 1076 (1997). That is, prior to the Lujan line of cases, a plaintiff did not "have to show
injury to a common law right or the existence of a special legislatively created cause of action. It
was enough to show some connection to the government decision being challenged and to make
arguments bearing some relationship to a federal regulatory scheme." Id.
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that is enforceable by the public at large, Lujan denied standing
notwithstanding the language and purpose of the ESA because the facts
relating to the individual plaintiff failed to demonstrate imminent,
particularized harm that would be redressed by the declaratory judgment
and injunction sought. 97 Because Lujan remains a leading case on
standing, courts have strained to harmonize the two cases, an effort
which has led to confusing standing jurisprudence and more litigation. 98
Courts should instead acknowledge that Akins substantially departed
from Lujan, and focus on determining which line of authority to apply in
non-FECA cases.

C. Relitigation of Akins
What Justice Blackmun expressed as rhetorical disbelief in his Lujan
dissent-that Lujan standing analysis would enable the Executive Branch
to simply ignore the Supreme Court's construction of a governing
statute99-has emerged in FECA standing litigation under Akins. By
rigidly relying on the Lujan analysis, the FEC has succeeded in muddling
the clear holding of Akins so as to force courts to "decide" the issues the
Supreme Court already resolved in Akins. 100 Not only does the
Commission's defensive strategy misdirect resources, it necessitates
complex standing litigation that is expensive for private parties to
undertake. As a result, relitigation of Akins operates as a barrier to

97. Before either Lujan or Akins, the Supreme Court, in United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S.
166 (1974), dismissed on standing grounds a taxpayer suit challenging the Government's failure to
disclose the expenditures of the Central Intelligence Agency. Id. at 170. Just as Justice Scalia relied
on Richardson in his Lujan opinion, Lujan, 504 U.S. at 575, he discussed it at length in his Akins
dissent, 524 U.S. at 31-36 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Richardson plaintiffs alleged that the agency
violated the constitutional requirement that '''a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and
Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time.'" 418 U.S. at 167--68 (citing
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7). Justice Scalia explained in Akins that the Richardson plaintiffs'
'''aggrievement' was precisely the 'aggrievement' [asserted in Akins]: the Government's unlawful
refusal to place information within the public domain." Akins, 524 U.S. at 32 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Indeed, the Richardson injury was even less tenuous, as the government was in actual possession of
the information sought. The Court found such a claim a nonjusticiable "generalized grievance"
because "the impact on [the plaintiff] is plainly undifferentiated and 'common to all members of the
public.'" Richardson, 418 U.S. at 176-77. Because the showing of actual individual harm flowing
from the deprivation of the information found lacking was simply not required by the Akins Court,
Richardson would have come out differently under Akins.
98. See infra Part Il.C.
99. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 605 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
100. See Morrison, supra note 68, at 624 n.158 (citing McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 228-29
(2003); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81
(2000)) ("Akins did not overrule Lujan, and subsequent decisions have continued to cite Lujan as
binding authority. ").
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reaching merits review of certain FEC decision making that the citizensuit provision expressly opens to scrutiny.
The trouble the Akins Court created by failing to repudiate Lujan is
exemplified in a pair of cases, Buchanan v. FEC 101 and Natural Law
Party of the United States v. FEC. 102 Both were actions brought by thirdparty presidential candidates challenging the FEC's dismissal of
administrative complaints alleging improprieties by the Committee on
Presidential Debates (CPO) in connection with the 1996 election. l03 The
FEC argued that because the elections were over by the time it dismissed
the administrative complaints, no live injuries existed and the courts
were powerless to redress past harm. l04 The Commission essentially
took the position that injury-in-fact is categorically impossible to satisfy
in FECA cases because, as a practical matter, elections are short-lived.
The nine-month election cycle makes it difficult to prove "'imminent'
injury" at the time the complaint is filed in federal court, the argument
went, leaving voters and defeated candidates susceptible to critique that
the injuries alleged are either '''some day' intentions" or '" [p ]ast
exposure to illegal conduct'" that do not suffice to establish injury-in-fact
under Lujan. 105
Both courts denied the FEC's motions to dismiss for lack of
standing, and ultimately identified the problem-implicit in the majority
decision in Akins, and in Justice Scalia's dissent-that the Akins majority
attempted to avoid: that "the acceptance of the FEC's overly narrow
construction of 'injury in fact' would be tantamount to shielding from
judicial review many, if not all, election cases,,,106 thus "read[ing]
FECA's judicial review provision out of the statute without any
constitutionally sound rationale.,,107 But in both cases, it took carefully
101. 112 F. Supp. 2d 58 (D.D.C. 2000).
102. III F. Supp. 2d 33 (D.D.C. 2000); see also Becker v. FEC, 230 F.3d 381, 383 (1st CiT.
2000) (involving challenge of FEC debate regulations allowing corporate funding of certain debatestaging organizations).
103. As the Buchanan court explained, "[t]he CPD is a private, non-profit corporation formed by
the two major parties in 1987 for the purpose of sponsoring presidential debates." 112 F. Supp. 2d at
61. It staged presidential debates leading up to the 1996 election imd others before it. Id.
104. Natural Law Party, III F. Supp. 2d at 42.
105. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,564 (1992).
106. Natural Law Party, III F. Supp. 2d at 42. The FEC did not argue that the plaintiffs lacked
prudential standing in any of these cases, which appears to be the only point it took well from the
Akins decision. See, e.g., Buchanan, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 65 n.6 ("The FEC does not challenge
plaintiffs' prudential standing to bring this case because it is clear that candidates, political parties,
and voters are within the 'zone of interests' protected by FECA."); Natural Law Party, III F. Supp.
2d at 43 ("Defendant does not argue that plaintiffs lack prudential standing, and, indeed, plaintiffs'
claims would seem to fall squarely within the 'zone of interests' to be protected by the FECA.").
107. Buchanan, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 69.
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rendered decisions following costly litigation for the district courts
simply to reach the conclusion that Akins says what it says.
If the FEC's circular standing analysis was correct, the Akins
plaintiffs would certainly have had no standing. In Akins itself, AlP AC
was alleged to have helped defeat one of the Akins plaintiffs, Paul
Findley, in the 1982 congressional election. 108 The administrative
complaint, filed in 1989, claimed that AIPAC had made illegal campaign
contributions 109 with respect to elections (one must presume) that
occurred in the past. IIO Neither the historical nature of the alleged
election-related injury nor the time-lag between election and enforcement
activity factored into the Supreme Court's standing inquiry. Still, the
Buchanan and Natural Law Party courts felt compelled to undertake a
detailed rebuttal of several pre-Akins cases relied upon by the FECI II to
argue not only that the alleged injury was insufficiently "'concrete and
particularized, '" but that it was "'conjectural or hypothetical '" within the
meaning of the tripartite Lujan test. ll2 The FEC's argument created a
double-bind: a FECA plaintiffs harm is either too stale or too
speculative, rendering FEC nonenforcement decisions largely
unreviewable despite the citizen-suit provision of the FECA itself.
The FEC took on Akins again in Kean for Congress Committee v.
FEC I13 after it was challenged for dismissing a defeated congressional
candidate committee's administrative complaint alleging that the Council
for Responsible Government (CRG) violated numerous FECA
prohibitions in connection with its advertisements against the candidate,
Tom Kean, Jr., in advance of the 2000 election. 114 The FEC moved to
dismiss, arguing that standing was lacking because the Kean Committee
failed to prove that Kean would run for office again,115 and accused the
plaintiff of taking "a 'radical position'" in basing its standing on the
FECA. 116 The Commission argued that the lack of FECA-related
information, without more, was an insufficient injury under Lujan-even
though it was squarely satisfied in Akins-because the plaintiff did not

108. Akins v. FEC, 101 F.3d 731, 734 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc), rev'd on other grounds, 524
U.S. II (1998).
109. Id.
110. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (suggesting we '''presum[e] that general allegations embrace
those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim ''').
III. Natural Law Party, III F. Supp. 2d at 43-45.
112. See Buchanan, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 62 (citing requirements of Lujan test).
113. 398 F. Supp. 2d 26 (D.D.C. 2005). The author represented the plaintiff in that action.
114. ld. at 27-28, 35.
115. ld. at 35-36.
116. ld. at 36 (quoting Def. Reply at 6-8).
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produce evidence to show particularized political injury to an active
candidate for office. The district court found that the FEC's argument
"misconstrues the holding of Akins," which found injury-in-fact because
the plaintiff sought information under the FECA.ll7 As in Akins, then, to
deny standing in Kean would have been to nullify the enforcement
provisions of the Act.
Courts continue to adjudicate the core holding of Akins in FECA
informational suits, and the confusion Akins created by glossing over the
injury-in-fact standard has made mischief in other contexts. Courts
struggle with the question whether some additional injury beyond mere
deprivation of information is necessary to satisfy Article III standing in
non-FECA cases involving a statutory right to information. A few have
distinguished the holding of Akins as "narrowly focused upon the widely
held fundamental right of voting and the lack of information was claimed
to be injurious to that right." I 18 On the other end of the spectrum, a court
ventured to state that a "necessary injury in fact might ... be premised
upon the ... violation of the Act itself.,,119 It expansively read Akins as
recognizing "injury sufficient to confer standing resulting from violation
of 'statute which ... does seek to protect individuals such as respondents
from the kind of harm they say they have suffered.",120
A majority of cases applying Akins appears to fall between these
poles by requiring what Akins did not-some showing of injury in
addition to a deprivation of information. 121 Even in the case of the voter117. Jd. (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 514 (1975)).
118. Heartwood, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. 1:00-CV-683, 2001 WL 1699203, at *\0 (W.O.
Mich. Dec. 3, 2001). In Atlantic States Legal Foundation v. Babbitt, a district court rejected a
nonprofit environmental organization's standing to challenge the EPA's failure to produce an
environmental impact statement (EIS) before issuing a permit allowing destruction of cormorant
birds. 140 F. Supp. 2d 185, 194 (N.D.N.Y. 2001). The court distinguished Akins as having arisen in
the "special context of voters' rights" and as uniquely "affected by the fact that the alleged
informational injury was directly related to the core constitutional right to vote." Jd. at 193 n.8. It
concluded that "the notion of informational harm, without more, does not confer standing in a NEPA
case as it is inconsistent with the requirement of establishing concrete and particularized harm"
under Lujan. Jd. at 194. However, the plaintiff did not rely upon the sheer absence of information to
justify its standing. It articulated numerous theories of injury to aesthetic enjoyment and alleged that
the lack of an EIS prevented it from distributing information about cormorant management,
assessing the impact of the defendants' activities, publishing information to its members, and
participating in the public commentary process guaranteed by the NEPA. Jd. at 192-94. None were
considered sufficient to establish a justiciable case under Lujan.
119. See Bloom v. NLRB, 153 F.3d 844, 849 n.2 (8th Cir. 1998) (noting that plaintiff's injury
was premised on an employee petition for review of an order of the National Labor Relations Board
approving settlement agreements between the employer and the union and dismissing his unfair
labor practice charges), vacated, 525 U.S. 1133 (1999).
120. Jd. (quoting FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11,22 (1998)).
121. See. e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 306 F.3d 1144, 1147-48 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (finding that
automobile manufacturer had standing to sue for judicial review of the EPA's framework of closed
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plaintiff seeking FECA information, where the Supreme Court has itself
acknowledged that the potential use for election-related information is
self-evident,122 courts have required that plaintiffs separately demonstrate
how they would use the information in voting. 123
Only months ago, the D.C. Circuit in Citizens for Responsibility and
Ethics in Washington [CREW} v. FEC 124 relied upon a pre-Akins
decision called Common Cause v. FEC 125 to deny standing in a case
challenging the FEC's dismissal of an administrative complaint under the
FECA's citizen-suit provision and, in doing so, markedly marginalized
Akins. Plaintiff CREW, a public interest group, challenged the receipt by
President Bush's 2004 presidential campaign of a contact list containing
information regarding conservative activists. 126 The FEC conducted an
investigation and agreed that the list constituted an in-kind contribution
under the FECA, and that the campaign violated the law, but declined to
take further action. 127 CREW sued on an informational standing theory,
claiming that an order requiring the FEC to assign a dollar value to the

proceedings for new motor vehicle testing based on the "[plaintiffs] fairly detailed description of
how the information that open rulemaking proceedings provide would prove useful to it"); Hodges v.
Abraham, 300 F.3d 432, 444 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that NEPA plaintiffs possess a procedural right
to have the Executive observe procedures mandated by law "'without meeting all the normal
standards for redressability and immediacy'" but only if "'the procedures in question are designed to
protect some threatened concrete interest of his that is the ultimate basis of his standing'" (quoting
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7, 573 n.8 (1992»); Kean for Congo Comm. v.
FEC, 398 F. Supp. 2d 26, 34-35 (D.D.C. 2005) (considering both the statutory grant of right to
requested information and whether "'there is no reason to doubt'" the usefulness of the information
to plaintiff (quoting Akins, 524 U.S. at 21 »; Alliance for Democracy V. FEC, 335 F. Supp. 2d 39, 48
(D.D.C. 2004) (construing Akins in FECA case as requiring that "plaintiffs ... show how [the
information they seek] could have a concrete effect on plaintiffs' voting in future elections involving
different candidates"); Ga. River Network v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1329,
1346 (N.D. Ga. 2003) (finding no standing under Akins where plaintiff suffered no injury as a result
of delay in receiving notice of a permit).
122. See Akins, 524 U.S. at 20, 24-26 (observing that information sought would "help voters
understand who provides which candidates financial support" and that voting is a core constitutional
right).
123. In one FECA case, the court construed Akins as requiring that "plaintiffs ... show how [the
information they seek] could have a concrete effect on plaintiffs' voting in future elections involving
different candidates." Alliance/or Democracy, 335 F. Supp. 2d at 48.
124. 475 F.3d 337 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
125. Although Common Cause V. FEC, 108 F.3d 413 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (per curiam), predated the
Supreme Court's decision in Akins, the D.C. Circuit itself had already decided Akins V. FEC, 101
F.3d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (en bane), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 524 U.S. II. In its
Akins decision, the D.C. Circuit held that "'[a] voter deprived of useful information at the time he or
she votes suffers a particularized injury' sufficient to create standing," but unlike the Supreme Court,
the D.C. Circuit "expressly limited [its] recognition of this injury to those cases where the
information denied is ... useful in voting." Common Cause, J08 F.3d at 418 (quoting Akins, JOI
F.3d at 737).
126. CREW, at 337-38.
127. Id. at 338.
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list would inure to the educational benefit of the voting public. 128 The
district court dismissed the complaint for lack of standing, finding under
Akins that there was '''reason[] to doubt''' that the list's value constituted
information that would be useful to CREW in voting, because it had no
members and-unlike the Akins and Kean plaintiffs-was not a
"participant[] in the political election and campaign process.,,129 The
D.C. Circuit affirmed, distinguishing the Akins plaintiffs on the grounds
that they had "wanted certain information so that they could make an
informed choice among candidates in future elections," whereas "CREW
cannot vote.,,130
Unnecessarily, the D.C. Circuit's narrow treatment of Akins's reach
did not stop with singling out voter-plaintiffs. First, the court went out of
its way to express its "wonder why the case is not moot," as "[t]he
election is over; President Bush is constitutionally barred from running
again; and Vice President Cheney has announced that he will not run.,,131
This language falls short of an outright suggestion that the only voterplaintiffs who could conceivably have standing to sue under the FECA's
citizen-suit provision are those able to show injury to their ability to cast
an informed vote in an imminent election, which would significantly
limit the already circumscribed scope of § 437g(a)(8).
Second, the D.C. Circuit's causation and redressability analysis
challenged that of the Akins majority. Not unlike Justice Scalia in his
Akins dissent, the D.C. Circuit indicated that the fact that "the
Commission has no authority to order anyone to report anything" is
preclusive of standing. 132 Even if the FEC brought an enforcement
action, the court observed further, there is no required redress. 133 In
other words, because CREW-like any FECA citizen plaintiff-was
essentially attempting to prompt government regulation of someone else,
causation and redressability were dispositive "problems.,,134
To be sure, the D.C. Circuit's overriding policy concern was that
CREW's complaint seemingly amounted to a disagreement "with the
Commission's judgment that its resources were better employed on

128. Id. at 339.
129. Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. [CREW] v. FEC, 401 F. Supp. 2d lIS, 12021 (D.D.C. 2005) (quoting Kean for Congo Comm. V. FEC, 398 F. Supp. 2d 26, 35 (D.D.C. 2005)),
aff'd, 475 F.3d 337 (D.C. CiT. 2007).
130. CREW, 475 F.3d at 339.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id.
Id. at 340.
Id.
Id.
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·
ot her, more Important
matters. ,,135 T
at h
court' s concern WIt. h enabl'mg
the judiciary to second-guess quintessentially Article II prerogatives was
not new to its particular jurisprudence. 136 And, of course, it is
unquestionably a critical component of the separation of powers. But as
the CREW court acknowledged,137 Akins did not undermine this most
basic of Article III standing's gate-keeping functions. So the CREW
court did not need to confront the Akins analysis so heavy-handedly in
order to justify its dismissal of the complaint on standing grounds.
As discussed below,138 the CREW decision may in part reflect the
judges' pragmatic views on the merits of the case; there appeared to be
no meaningful campaign or election-related information still to be gained
by the lawsuit. To support this aspect of its holding, the D.C. Circuit
relied partially on its own dated jurisprudence, dismissing the argument
that its 1997 decision in Common Cause '''must yield' to the Supreme
Court's later decision in Akins.,,139 Indeed, the court flatly retorted that
"[t]he short answer is that we have never overruled Common Cause and
we have applied its holding and rationale after Akins.,,14o
Although the D.C. Circuit's failure to marry its prior decision with
Akins-instead merely noting that Common Cause is still standing in
spite of it-is rather remarkable, the Supreme Court could have avoided
the doctrinal problem by, first, making clear in Akins that it was
reconfiguring (if not partially overruling) Lujan's strict causation and
redressability requirements and, second, defining the ambit of the Akins
standard. Because it cannot be fully reconciled with the leading public
law case on constitutional standing, Akins is at risk of becoming a dead
letter, as are the gains to standing law that its groundbreaking analysis

[d.
See id. at 341 n.2 (citing Am. Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Ringling
Bros. & Barnum & Bailey Circus, 317 F.3d 334, 337 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (finding standing to sue circus
owner under the citizen-suit provision of the ESA because observation of physical manifestations of
the alleged mistreatment of elephants "takes [plaintiffs] claim out of the category of a generalized
interest in ensuring the enforcement of the law"); Wertheimer v. FEC, 268 F.3d 1070, 1074 (D.C.
Cir. 2001) (finding no standing "under the Akins test" because appellants failed to show either that
they were being deprived of information or that a favorable ruling would lead to disclosure of
information); Judicial Watch, Inc. v. FEC, 180 F.3d 277, 278 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (dismissing FECA
complaint for lack of standing because it did not even nominally allege reporting violations)).
137. [d. at 340 ("The Supreme Court in Akins recognized that the Commission, like other
Executive agencies, retains prosecutorial discretion." (citing FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11,25 (1998))).
138. See infra Part IV.B.
139. CREW, 475 F.3d at 341 n.2.
140. [d. at 341 & n.2 (citing Common Cause v. FEC, 108 F.3d 413, 418 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (per
curiam) (finding no FECA standing to sue for "information concerning a violation of the Act as
such")).
135.
136.
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appeared to foreshadow. 141 There is simply no safe harbor in which to
apply Akins as the law of the case.
III. ARTICLE II AND THE CONGRESSIONAL GRANT OF FECA STANDING

It is important to underscore that the D.C. Circuit could have
comfortably pointed to the one piece of information that everyone agreed
had not been disclosed in CREW-the value of the list of conservative
activists at issue-and declared that standing exists to obtain such
information under Akins if the FECA requires its disclosure. The court's
quiet defiance of Akins's straightforward holding in this regard signals
the CREW majority'sl42 discomfort with a justiciability jurisprudence
that would enable review of Executive decision making on such trivial
grounds, without any particularized Lujan-type injury. It reflects a
fundamental and polarized policy debate about the proper role of the
judiciary in the American tripartite system of government that is
epitomized in the doctrinal clash between Lujan and Akins.
This Part explains the competing justiciability theories underlying
the two cases and concludes that, its significant merit notwithstanding,
the private law model of adjudication upon which Lujan is based is not
uniformly tenable; in the FECA context, at least, the public law model
has warranted real consideration without meaningful encroachment on
Executive prerogatives. Although the FECA's citizen-suit provision
enables the judiciary to weigh in on Executive enforcement decisions,
that influence is minimal and does not in-and-of-itself justify Lujan's
expansive ban on generalized grievances.

A. Executive Accountability and Generalized Grievances
The injury-in-fact test as epitomized in Lujan is a judicial
manifestation of the belief that the case-or-controversy requirement 143 is
"founded in concern about the proper-and properly limited-role of the
courts in a democratic society.,,144 Federal courts may exercise power
"only 'in the last resort, and as a necessity, '" and only when use of the
141. See Sunstein, supra note 10, at 616 (deeming Akins "by far the most important
pronouncement on the general issue of standing to obtain information" and discussing its
implications).
142. Judge Garland concurred in the judgment on the grounds that "there is no meaningful
distinction between this case and Common Cause v. FEC, 108 F.3d 413 (D.C. Cir. 1997)." CREW,
475 F.3d at 341 (Garland, J., concurring).
143. See U.S. CONST. art.lIl, § 2 (outlining jurisdiction of courts).
144. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
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judicial powers is "'consistent with a system of separated powers. ",145
Viewed in the light of the respective spheres of influence that define the
three branches of government, the standing doctrine assumes that judicial
restraint enhances the ability of the executive and legislative branches to
function effectively.146 In Allen v. Wright, the Court found that minority
parents lacked standing to challenge tax deductions to segregated private
schools, on the theory that judges would otherwise become "'virtually
continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive
action",147 and impinge upon the President's prerogative to "'take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed. ",148 By this logic, a lawsuit aimed
at "restructuring ... the apparatus established by the Executive Branch to
fulfill its legal duties" fails to satisfy Article III on Article II separation
of powers grounds. 149
While the Framers' wisdom in precluding citizens from invoking the
judiciary to force an agency to reorder its regulatory objectives is
transparent, whether Congress can endow that power is trickier. The
Supreme Court has wrestled with the question whether Congress can
enact a law with a self-contained justiciability grant for decades. 150
Although accepted in principle, lSI statutes like the FECA's citizen-suit
provision are constitutionally controversial. In keeping with a so-called
purely private law model of adjudication, Justice Scalia readily accepts
that certain acts of Congress face dormancy or death if the Executive
Branch refuses or fails to enforce them, and his Supreme Court opinions
reflect this belief. 152 Adherents to this model eschew legislation that
empowers private litigants to engage in enforcement activity, paired with
a provision for judicial review, as "end runs" around the Executive.
Standing exists under this theory to resolve primarily common-law-like

145. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (internal citations omitted).
146. See John G. Roberts, Jr., Article III Limits on Statutory Standing, 42 DUKE L.1. 1219,1229
(1993) (advocating strict adherence to the injury-in-fact test).
147. 468 U.S. at 760 (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1,15 (1972».
148. Id. at 761 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3).
149. Id.; see also Sunstein, supra note 5, at 194-95 (discussing the Allen v. Wright opinion in
which the Court referred to Article II and separation of powers).
150. See Sunstein, supra note 5, at 193 (discussing the evolution of the congressionally created
citizen suit).
151. See supra note 50 and accompanying text (stating that the Supreme Court has recognized
congressional power to create justiciable statutory rights).
152. See Hudson P. Henry, A Shift in Citizen Suit Standing Doctrine: Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.
Laidlaw Environmental Services, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233, 240-41 (2001) (discussing Justice Scalia's
1983 article, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17
SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 881 (1983».
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interests, not those of beneficiaries of government regulation. 153 Justice
Scalia makes this argument in his Akins dissent. 154
Accordingly, in Lujan Justice Scalia described legislation granting
and circumscribing agency authority to carry on governmental activities
as '''permit[ting] the courts to participate in law enforcement ... only to
the extent necessary to protect justiciable individual rights against
By
administrative action fairly beyond the granted powers. ",155
"[i]ndividual rights," Justice Scalia did "not mean public rights that have
been legislatively pronounced to belong to each individual who forms
part of the public.,,156 Chief Justice Roberts has similarly explained:
[If] Congress . . . could specify that any person who wants to sue the
agency in federal court may do so if he believes the agency is not living
up to its mandate[, s]uch a state of affairs would transform the courts
into ombudsmen of the administrative bureaucracy, a role for which
they are ill-suited both institutionally and as a matter of democratic
157
theory.

Although Justice Scalia's OplnIOn in Lujan accepted the principle that
'''[t]he ... injury required by Art. III may exist solely by virtue of
statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing, ",158
it did so only with the caveat that "in suits against the Government, at
least, the concrete injury requirement must remain.,,159 It is therefore
unsurprising that in his Akins dissent, Justice Scalia focused on the nature
of the requisite injury: "'Particularized' means that 'the injury must
affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.' If the effect is
'undifferentiated and common to all members of the public,' the plaintiff

153. See Sunstein, supra note 5, at 187-88 (discussing standing in the context of common law).
154. See FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11,31 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that if such
provisions "were commonplace, the role of the Executive ... would be greatly reduced"). See also
Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Friends a/the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services
(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 198 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting), concluding that the majority turned the
injury-in-fact requirement into a "sham" by finding that an environmental group had standing to
bring a citizen action against a wastewater treatment facility for noncompliance with the limits set by
the facility's National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit, and his majority opinion in
Steel Co. v. Citizens/or a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83,109-10 (1998), denying standing for a
citizen-suit claim under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act.
155. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992) (quoting Stark v. Wickard, 321
U.S. 288,309-10 (1944)) (emphasis added).
156. Id. at 578.
157. Roberts, supra note 146, at 1232.
158. 504 U.S. at 578 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975)) (alteration in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
159. Id.
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has a 'generalized grievance' that must be pursued by political, rather
. d'ICla,
. I means. ,,160
than JU
This one-size-fits-all understanding of the relationships between the
judicial branch and the elected branches of functioning democracy
assumes that accountability for agencies "not living up to [their]
mandate[s]" 161 lies elsewhere. In particular, it assumes that Congress or
the President, properly influenced by voters, will wield political pressure
on an ineffective agency to get it to do its job, or change the law so as to
ensure that endemic problems are remedied.
For his part, Justice Scalia's answer to the problem of agency failure
to enforce an Act of Congress is decidedly not to expand private access
to the courts, which he views as "restrict[ ed] ... to their assigned role of
protecting minority rather than majority interests.,,'62 He has both asked
the rhetorical question: "Does what I have said mean that, so long as no
minority interests are affected, 'important legislative purposes, heralded
in the halls of Congress, [can be] lost or misdirected in the vast hallways
of the federal bureaucracy?'" and answered it: "Of course it does-and a
good thing, too," because "[t]he ability to lose or misdirect laws can be
said to be one of the prime engines of social change.,,'63 The Supreme
Court elsewhere explained it this way: "The assumption that if
respondents have no standing to sue, no one would have standing, is not
a reason to find standing.,,'64
Because separation-of-powers concerns implicate not only the proper
allocation and preservation of Presidential power-but also that of the
legislature and the judiciary-Justice Scalia's response does not
adequately address the question raised by the Akins/Lujan dilemma: Can
Congress endow citizens with standing to challenge in federal court
agency nonenforcement of legislation? The Constitution provides no
guidance for determining which laws are enforceable only through the
political process. If Congress determines that agency enforcement of its
legislative initiatives is inadequate, and that citizens should have access
to the courts to prompt enforcement of the law, does the Constitution
forbid Congress from legislating standing for that purpose? Under such
circumstances, the political solution to underenforcement that the private

160. FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. II, 35 (1998) (Scalia, 1., dissenting) (quoting United States v.
Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 177 (1974) and Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 & n.I).
161. Roberts, supra note 146, at 1232.
162. Scalia, supra note 152, at 895.
163. Id at 897 (quoting Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm'n,
449 F.2d 1109, IIII (D.C. Cir. 1971)) (alteration in original).
164. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 (1974).
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law model relies upon-Executive oversight or more and better
legislation-is presumably insufficient, at least in the eyes of Congress.
Lujan would not nullify citizen-suit legislation under such circumstances,
but would stave off litigation absent identification of a plaintiff who can
show the requisite individualized harm.
The public law model, by contrast, would unambiguously empower
Congress to create causes of action that confer standing on particular
plaintiffs without requiring a differentiated showing of injury,165 and
conceives of the judiciary's role in the separation of powers as integral to
ensuring Executive compliance with the law. Accordingly, Justice
Blackmun dissented in Lujan because he was "unable to agree with the
plurality's analysis of redressability, based as it is on its invitation of
executive lawlessness.,,166 On this theory, the FECA's citizen-suit
provision represents an attempt to ensure, through the courts, "the
integrity of our electoral process, and, not less, the responsibility of the
individual citizen for the successful functioning of that process.,,167
Both Lujan and Akins involved challenges to agencies' procedural
failures-nonadherence to interagency consultation requirements and the
refusal to investigate an alleged campaign finance violation,
respectively-pursuant to statutes that authorized citizen suits as means
of enforcement. Akins clearly held that Congress has the power to create
standing by delineating procedural rights that are enforceable by an
undifferentiated citizenry. Although Lujan suggests that self-executing
citizen-suit statutes are unconstitutional absent a plaintiff with
particularized injury,168 Justice Blackmun's dissent expressed a contrary
hope that "over time the Court will acknowledge that some classes of
procedural duties are so enmeshed with the prevention of a substantive,
concrete harm that an individual plaintiff may be able to demonstrate a
sufficient likelihood of injury just through the breach of that procedural
dUty.,,169
The conflation of the public and the private that Justice Blackmun
foresaw has already emerged in some cases, and undermines the practical
viability of the private law model. Several examples of procedural harms
deemed justiciable by the courts exist. The Freedom of Information Act

165. See generally Henry, supra note 152, at 241 (discussing the public and private law models).
166. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 601 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
167. United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 570 (1957); see also Becker v. FEC, 230 FJd 381,
389 (1st Cir. 2000) (finding that Ralph Nader had standing to sue the FEC "[i]n light of the FECA's
concern with ensuring that corporate funds do not undermine the fairness of federal elections").
168. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, at 95.
169. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 605 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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(FOIA),170 the most obvious of these, endows an undifferentiated public
right to information. Its uncontroversial enforcement by the courts
manifests the view that, "as a general matter, the courts owe substantial
deference to Congress' substantive purpose in imposing a procedural
requirement.,,171 The existence of early qui tam suits authorizing private
citizens to litigate on behalf of the public, moreover, provides historical
evidence that the Supreme Court's individualized injury requirement is
out-of-sync with the Constitution.172 In an opinion authored by Justice
Scalia, the modem Court upheld the federal False Claims Act's qui tam
provisions under Article III without a showing that the relator was
injured by the alleged fraud. 173
To be sure, Akins's recognition of the judiciary's statutory
prerogative to force the other branches of government to "do their jobs"
is circumscribed. A district court prominently refused to read Akins as
requiring disclosure of information by Vice President Dick Cheney to the
Comptroller General, for example, regarding meetings of his national
energy task force in Walker v. Cheney.174 The pertinent statute allows
the Comptroller General to enforce statutory investigatory powers by
bringing a civil action to require agency heads to produce records. 175
The court declined to construe the legislative grant of enforcement power
as authorizing suit by the Comptroller General because to do so would
"affect[] the balance of power between the Article I and Article II
Branches.,,176 Although nominally a standing decision, the court was

170. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).
171. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 606 (Blackmun, 1., dissenting). Professor Cass Sunstein maintains,
accordingly, that "[a)n injury in fact . . . is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for
standing" because "[w)hether a plaintiff has standing depends on what the relevant statute says."
Sunstein, supra note 10, at 639, 637-38; see also Fletcher, supra note 62, at 253-54 (arguing that the
Court acts improperly in denying standing where Congress explicitly conferred it).
172. See Morrison, supra note 68, at 626 & n.168 (collecting articles).
173. See Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rei. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 774 (2000)
(finding that the "United States' injury in fact suffices to confer standing" on the relator). In
Vermont Agency of Natural Resources, Justice Scalia rejected the argument that the statutory
monetary rewards provided to the private-party relator if the complaint results in money damages to
the government are sufficient to confer standing, since that interest does not "consist of obtaining
compensation for, or preventing, the violation of a legally protected right." Id. at 772-73. Instead,
he grounded standing for qui tam relators on the "doctrine that the assignee of a claim has standing
to assert the injury in fact suffered by the assignor." Id. at 773. Professor Sunstein has also
advocated legislation that includes bounties to prevailing plaintiffs for purposes of satisfying the
injury-in-fact standard as it exists. Sunstein, supra note 5, at 168.
174. See 230 F. Supp. 2d 51, 66 n.IO (D.D.C. 2002) (distinguishing Akins by noting that the
lawsuit was brought "by private parties, not government officials, and thus involved injuries in
which the plaintiffs ... had only a personal stake").
175. 31 U.S.C. § 716(b)(2) (2000).
176. Walker, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 69-70.
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fundamentally troubled by the separation of powers implications of the
statute itself. I77 The Vice President argued that "Congress cannot,
consistent with separation of powers principles, endow the Comptroller
General with the authority to bring this judicial action.,,178 Although the
dispute involved Congress's attempt to enforce its own rights to
Executive Branch information,179 the court's view rested on the same
theory underlying Justice Scalia's dissent in Akins-that the role of the
courts is to protect "the constitutional rights and liberties of individual
citizens and minority groups against oppressive or discriminatory
. ,,180
government actIon.
The Cheney decision is consistent with the thrust of Lujan standing
jurisprudence that virtually forecloses the generic citizen from seeking to
remedy general complaints about how the Executive Branch is operating.
In this respect, "informational standing"-or standing to obtain
information a statute makes public-is a rarity. 181 Although Akins
represents a shift in the majority of the then-current Justices' thinking
toward allowing Congress to authorize citizens to bring lawsuits
enforcing government regulations, the Court is by no means ready to
dispense with the injury-in-fact requirement. 182 The Lujan Court's
separation-of-powers stance that "[v ]indicating the public interest
(including the public interest in Government observance of the
Constitution and laws) is the function of Congress and the Chief
177. See id. at 59 (discussing merits).
178. Id. at 60.
179. See id. at 71 (discussing the Comptroller General's arguments as to why Congress has the
right to the Executive Branch information).
180. Id. at 72 (citing United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 192 (1974) (Powell, J.,
concurring)). Implicit in another case, United States House of Representatives v. United States
Department of Commerce, II F. Supp. 2d 76 (D.D.C. 1998), is the opposing viewpoint. The court
found that the House of Representatives had Article III standing to sue the Commerce Department
and the Census Bureau challenging their plan to use statistical sampling in the upcoming census
because the alleged failure to use the statutorily required methodology was an "informational and
compositional injur[y]." Id. at 91.
181. See Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. FEC, 69 F.3d 600, 603 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ("This
statute is unusual in that it permits a private party to challenge the FEC's decision not to enforce.").
But cf Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 198-215 (2000)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (addressing citizen-suit provision in Water Act); supra note 33 and
accompanying text (listing a handful of federal statutes expressly conferring standing on "any
person," "citizen," or "party" to challenge agency actions).
182. Henry, supra note 152, at 249; see also Lance v. Coffman, 127 S. Ct. 1194, 1198 (per
curiam) (finding that Colorado citizens lacked standing to bring a challenge under the Elections
Clause of the U.S. Constitution because "[t]he only injury plaintiffs allege is that the law ... has not
been followed [which] is precisely the kind of undifferentiated, generalized grievance about the
conduct of government that we have refused to countenance in the past"). But cf Massachusetts v.
EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1453-56 (2007) (adopting Akins analysis to find that State has standing to sue
the EPA to force rulemaking concerning widely-shared global warming risks).
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Executive" is unassailable at the margins. 183 The barrier to adjudicating
generalized grievances properly prevents the pure ideologue from suing
over distaste with how the government is operating. 184 Given the myriad
problems with the injury-in-fact test as we know it, what is less evident is
whether the Court's endowment of the Lujan standard with "separationof-powers significance" properly keeps the judiciary out of the business
of vindicating the public interest. 185
B. The Case of the FEC: Circularity and Conundrum
As Justice Stevens noted in his Lujan concurrence, "[w]e must
presume that if this Court holds that [the ESA] requires consultation, all
affected agencies would abide by that interpretation," as "[c]ertainly the
Executive Branch cannot be heard to argue that an authoritative
construction of the governing statute by this Court may simply be
ignored by an agency head.,,186 An adherent to the private law model
might be comfortable resting on faith that the Executive will consistently
choose to follow the law for fear of political reprisal. If Jane Doe's
frustration with the federal government's budget failures is insufficiently
concrete to trigger the jurisdiction of an Article III court, she need only
cast her votes in protest or, failing that, lobby her congressional
representatives for reform. The harshness that, on certain facts, Lujan's
injury-in-fact standard produces is palatable to some only because the
political branches are positioned to handle generalized grievances.
A citizen-suit statute challenges this view of the separation of powers
by enabling outsiders to invoke the judiciary to enhance traditional
Executive enforcement mechanisms in a statutory arena of particular
congressional concern. Although Congress sets the parameters for
Executive enforcement action by passing the laws to be enforced, the
Constitution does not expressly enable or preclude the legislation of
private citizens' access to the courts to bring about enforcement
activity. 187 Democratic theory aside, the separation of powers concerns

183. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576 (1992).
184. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, at 96.
185. 504 U.S. at 577.
186. Id. at 585 (Stevens, J., concurring).
187. Congress has broad power under the Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution to
pass legislation to redress social, economic, and other problems the legislature identifies as
important. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; see a/so M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,
323-26 (1819) (examining Congress's role in determining what is "necessary and proper"). The
dimensions of that power under the text and history of the Constitution is an issue that is beyond the
scope of this Article.
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that underlie a pure private law model of adjudication are somewhat
alleviated empirically by the fact that Congress's invocation of its
perceived power to endow citizens with the right to sue to enforce
legislation is hardly ubiquitous. 188 It is thus fair to assume that political
accountability is sufficient for ensuring that the laws are properly
enforced in most instances.
If the private law model correctly assumes that politics suffice to
ensure Executive accountability in all areas of congressional and public
concern, the question arises as to whether the FECA's citizen suit (and
Akins's substantiation of it) is justifiable at all. This subpart considers
that question and concludes that, in light of the widespread but disparate
criticism of the FEC's effectiveness, the FECA's circumscribed citizensuit provision is a reasonable exercise of Congress's power to "legislate"
this type of standing.
The FECA's citizen-suit provision was added as an amendment to
the original bill and is described in the legislative history as "the one
provision . . . that will enable the public to get a better look at the
investigative process to be used against suspected violators of the
law.,,189 The sparse legislative history suggests that the provision was at
its inception and has since been uncontroversial in the Congress. The
1976 amendments allowed "any person," including a member or
employee of the FEC, to file a verified (versus anonymous)
administrative complaint. 190
In the floor debate over the 1979
amendments, one member explained:
The Commission is entrusted with the responsibility of passing on
complaints.
[The citizen-suit provision] provides that an order
dismissing a complaint is reviewable in court solely to assure that the
Commission's action is not based on an error of law. And to assure
that the Commission does not shirk its responsibility to decide that
section also provides that a total failure to address a complaint within
191
120 days is a basis for a court action.

188. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
189. S. REP. No. 92-229, at 110 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1821, 1848.
190. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1057, at 50 (1976) (Conf. Rep.).
191. 125 CONGo REC. 36,744, 36,754 (1979) (statement of Sen. Pel\). Senator Pel\ goes on to
state
these two limited bases for judicial intervention are not intended to work a transfer of
prosecutorial discretion from the Commission to the courts. Thus, for example, if the
Commission considers a case and is evenly divided as to whether to proceed, that
division which under the act precludes Commission action on the merits is not subject to
review any more than a similar prosecutorial decision by a U.S. attorney.
Id. The current statute does not include a carve-out to preclude review of a tie vote by the
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Whether the speaker's concern with the Commission "shirk[ing] its
responsibility" is valid remains a sharply debated question. Critics
disagree over whether the FEC is too lax or too stringent in enforcing the
law, both sides arguing that-for very opposite reasons-the current
system is flawed in one way or another. 192
The FEC was created in 1974 for purposes of administering and
enforcing the federal campaign finance laws and is reputed to be a
"toothless tiger" amongst some critics. 193 By virtue of its structure,
critics contend, the Commission is inherently conflicted in terms of the
vigor with which it can reasonably be expected to enforce the terms of
the FECA against politicians, their parties, and their affiliates. 194 The
FEC comprises six politicized members, three from each party, and a
deadlocked vote kills an enforcement action. 195 The 1974 statute
creating the agency empowered Congress to appoint four of the six
commissioners with the President choosing the other two,196 but the
Supreme Court struck down this system in Buckley v. Valeo on the
grounds that it violated the President's appointment authority under
Article II of the Constitution. 197 Congress amended the FECA in 1976 to
shift the appointment power entirely to the President on confirmation by
the Senate,198 but it is said to be "common knowledge" that congressional
party leaders have continued to exercise considerable power over the
Commission, which would make little sense in any event. A 3-3 vote is effectively a decision not to
take enforcement action, although a majority did not so find. A 4-3 vote not to take enforcement
action, by contrast, implies that commissioners from both sides of the political aisle agree to stand
down on a complaint.
192. See generally Todd Lochner, Overdeterrence, Underdeterrence, and a (Half-Hearted) Call
for a Scarlet Letter Approach to Deterring Campaign Finance Violations, 2 ELECTION L.J. 23
(2003) (addressing both critiques and suggesting a public shaming approach to campaign finance
violators).
193. E.g., Amanda S. La Forge, Comment, The Toothless Tiger-Structural, Political and Legal
Barriers to Effective FEC Enforcement: An Overview and Recommendations, 10 ADMIN. L.J. 351,
358-73 (1996); Bill McAllister, FEC Admits Failures in Plea for Funding: Agency Outlines Wide
Probe of '96 Campaign, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 1997, at A8. See generally PROJECT FEC, No BARK,
NO BITE, No POINT: THE CASE FOR CLOSING THE FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION AND
ESTABLISHING A NEW SYSTEM FOR ENFORCING THE NATION'S CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS 5 (2002)
(arguing the Commission's structure prevents it from being effective).
194. See, e.g., La Forge, supra note 193, at 365 ("[T]he FEC finds itself in the unique position of
regulating the very people who control its annual budget."); McAllister, supra note 193 (reporting on
the FEe's admission that it had "failed to move swiftly against politicians who violate campign
finance laws"). See generally PROJECT FEC, supra note 193 (advocating dissolution of the FEC and
the establishment ofa new means to enforce campaign finance laws).
195. See 2 U.S.C. § 437c (2000) (describing structure of FE C).
196. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 3 10(a)(I), 88
Stat. 1263, 1280--81, declared unconstitutional by Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I (1976).
197. 424 U.S. at 132-36 (per curiam); PROJECT FEC, supra note 193, at 15.
198. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, § 101(a)(l), 90
Stat. 475, 475.
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appointment process. 199 As a result, the choice of commissioners can
rest on political affiliations rather than expertise.z°o In overseeing an
agency whose mission is to oversee members of Congress, Congress has
been accused of underfunding the FEC, launching intrusive audits, and
otherwise hobbling its regulator. 20 I Numerous courts have derided the
FEC as having historically taken "a permissive view" of the campaign
laws.z°2
This portrait of the "FEC-as-Iapdog" of the politicians is strongly
disputed, with other scholars depicting a very different agency that is not
only competent and adaptable, but guilty of overenforcement of the
campaign finance and election laws in excess of the Commission's
constitutional and statutory authority.203
There is purportedly
"widespread belief' amongst the practicing bar that the FEC goes after
minor players to affect legal behavior by intimidation,z°4 and courts have
repeatedly struck down the FEC's construction of the FECA as vastly
overreaching.z°5
Whether guilty of underenforcement or
overenforcement, then, the FEC is a reasonably susceptible target for

199. PROJECT FEC, supra note 193, at 16 (citing Jackie Koszczuk, Money Woes Leave FEC
Watchdog with More Bark Than Bite, 56 CONGo Q. 469,469 (1998); Peter H. Stone, Teaching a
Lapdog to Bite, 25 NAT'L J. 2914, 2914 (1993); Tim Curran, Secretary of Senate Gets Official Nod
by the President to Become Member of the Federal Election Commission, ROLL CALL, Sept. 30,
1996).
200. Id. at 15-18,60--65. Former FEC Commissioner Frank Reiche has explained that members
of Congress "view the members of the commission as representatives of their party-you can't have
a successful campaign finance commission if that is the premise upon which appointments are
made." Deirdre Davidson, Who's Afraid of the FEC?: Why the FEC Doesn't Have Any Weight to
Throw Around, TOMPAINE.COM, Oct. 3, 2000, http://www.tompaine.com/Archive/scontenti
3700.html.
201. PROJECT FEC, supra note 193, at 19.
202. Shays V. FEC, 414 F.3d 76, 81,106 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (stating also that FEC rules "fly in the
face" of the enabling statute's purpose, and noting the "absurdity" of the FEC's position); see also,
e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 142 (2003) (finding that FEC had "subverted" federal election
campaign laws); Shays v. FEC, 337 F. Supp. 2d 28, 63, 70, 79 (D.D.C. 2004) (finding that
challenged FEC regulation would "undercut[] FECA's statutory purpose" and "foster corruption,"
and observing that the challenged FEC regulation would "render the statute largely meaningless"),
aff'd, 414 F.3d 76.
203. Bradley A. Smith & Stephen M. Hoersting, A Toothless Anaconda: Innovation, Impotence
and Overenforcement at the Federal Election CommiSSion, I ELECTION LJ. 145, 162--63 (2002).
For a point-by-point response to the arguments underlying the view that the FEC is a meek
enforcement agency, see Bradley A. Smith, Campaign Finance Reform: What Congress and the
FEC Should Do Next, 1881 P.L.1. CORP. 347, 350-55 (2002).
204. Smith & Hoersting, supra note 203, at 156.
205. Id. at 162--69 (discussing cases); see also, e.g., FEC v. Christian Action Network, Inc., 110
F.3d 1049, 1050 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that FEC's position that advocacy organization's
expenditures for television commercial violated federal election laws governing disclosure of
campaign funds lacked substantial justification under the Equal Access to Justice Act).
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third party enforcement mechanisms such as the FECA's citizen-suit
provision.
Additionally, it is important to keep in mind that the scope of the
FECA's citizen-suit provision is relatively narrow.
On balance,
Congress was not overreaching in allowing judicial review of certain
nonenforcement decisions. The FEC does rely on outside complaints in
some measure to carry out its statutory mandate. Although FECA
enforcement proceedings germinate either internally from FEC
investigators or externally from third-party complaints,206 a 1999 study of
approximately eighty FEC matters under review (also known as
"MURs") revealed that a heavy proportion-sixty-three percent-were
initiated by outside parties,207 who were more likely to target campaigns
and candidates208 and to allege disclosure violations-as in Akins-than
so-called "substantive" FECA violations, such as excessive contributions
or the use of prohibited funds. 209 The universe of claims that potentially
trigger the FECA's citizen-suit provision is comprised exclusively of
those that are dismissed prior to investigation and those for which the
Commission failed to timely take any action whatsoever. 2lO About
thirty-two percent of the sample claims were dismissed preinvestigation,
and eighty-eight percent of those were brought by third parties. 211
Given that a majority of the dismissed sample complaints were
brought by outside parties, scholars have posited that a large portion of
third-party complaints may amount to frivolous gamesmanship aimed at
206. The FEC is an independent agency with exclusive jurisdiction over enforcement of the
FECA. 2 U.S.c. §§ 437c(b)(l), 437d(a)(3), 437g (2000). The Commission is authorized to institute
investigations of possible FECA violations and "any person" may file a sworn administrative
complaint alleging a violation of the Act. Id. § 437g(a)(l)-(2). Upon receipt ofa complaint and any
response, the FEC's General Counsel usually forwards a recommendation to the Commission as to
whether there is "reason to believe" or "RTB" that a violation of the Act has occurred, and the
Commission votes. Id. If four or more members find RTB, the FEC commences an investigation.
Id. After the investigation, the full Commission votes again, this time to determine if there is
"probable cause" to believe the FECA has been violated. Jd. § 437g(a)(4)(A)(i). If a majority finds
probable cause, the FEC will attempt to reach a conciliation agreement. Id. In the absence of such
an agreement, the Commission can vote to institute a de novo civil enforcement action. Id. §
437g(a)(6)(A). At any point in the process, a tie vote will lead to dismissal of the complaint. See
Common Cause v. FEC, 108 F.3d 413,415 (D.C. CiT. 1997) (per curiam) (discussing facts where a
deadlocked Commission led to dismissal of a complaint).
207. Todd Lochner & Bruce E. Cain, Equity and Efficacy in the Enforcement of Campaign
Finance Laws, 77 TEX. L. REv. 1891, 1910, 1927 (1999).
208. Id. at 1912.
209. Id. at 1913.
210. See 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(8)(A) (providing that "[a]ny party aggrieved by an order of the
Commission dismissing a complaint filed by such party [with the FEC], or by a failure of the
Commission to act on such complaint during the 120-day period beginning on the date the complaint
is filed, may file a petition with the United States District Court for the District of Columbia").
211. Lochner & Cain, supra note 207, at 1916, 1920.
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Irntating political opponents. 212 Facilitating judicial review for this
group of claimants might exacerbate any wasted resources problem that
already exists. But the protracted administrative process for disposing of
these claims-with most taking a minimum of eleven months to
conclude-undermines the deterrent value of enforcement within any
particular campaign cycle. 213 To the extent third parties do file
administrative complaints simply to anger an opponent, their incentive to
expend the resources to challenge a dismissal in court one or two years
later-postelection-seems diminutive, as evidenced by the mere
handful of cases involving citizen-suit complaints,z14 The goal of
winning an election may justify law-breaking and the attendant penalties,
which are internalized as a cost of doing business. 215 As the adverse
publicity caused by the filing of an administrative complaint is not
considered a formidable deterrent for election law violators,216 the
purportedly large percentage of third-party complaints that end in
dismissal has not translated into a flood of FECA citizen-suit litigation.
If the dismissed claims that wind up in court do predominantly
involve the FECA's disclosure provisions, they may constitute an
appropriate subgroup of claims for which the extraordinary third-party
enforcement measure should apply. Public opinion favors election and
campaign finance laws.217 The Supreme Court has noted "a profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should
be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,,,218 and, applying this principle to
disclosure provisions, has stated that "disclosure requirements deter

212. ld. at 1904, 1920.
213. ld. at 1929, 1932.
214. A review of the FEC's website identifies fifty-seven FECA cases filed in federal court
between 2001 and 2006. Alphabetical Index of FEC Court Cases, http://www.fec.gov/law/
litigationalpha.shtml (last visited Mar. 9, 2007). Ten of these were citizen suits brought pursuant to
2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(8). Hagelin v. FEC, 411 F.3d 237 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Citizens for Responsibility
& Ethics in Wash. v. FEC, 401 F. Supp. 2d 115 (D.D.C. 2005), aff'd, 475 F.3d 337; Alliance for
Democracy v. FEC, 362 F. Supp. 2d 138 (D. D.C. 2005); ludicial Watch v. FEC, No. Civ.A. 011747,2005 WL 433344 (D.D.C. Feb. 17,2005); Kean for Congo Comm. V. FEC, 398 F. Supp. 2d 26
(D. D.C. 2005); Alliance for Democracy V. FEC, 335 F. Supp. 2d 39 (D.D.C. 2004); Bush-Cheney
'04, Inc. V. FEC, No. 04CVOl501 (D.D.C. filed Sept. I, 2004); Akins V. FEC, No. 03CV02431
(D.D.C. filed Nov. 25, 2003); ludicial Watch V. FEC, 293 F. Supp. 2d 41 (D.D.C. 2003); Common
Cause V. FEC, No. 0lCV02423 (D.D.C. filed Nov. 21, 2001). A Westlaw search revealed an
additional citizen-suit case, Tierney V. FEC, No. I :06CV00663, 2006 WL 1344027 (D.D.C. Apr. II,
2006). Together, these eleven cases comprise roughly nineteen percent of all FECA cases filed from
2001 to 2006.
215. Lochner & Cain, supra note 207, at 1930.
216. ld. at 1919.
217. Lauren Eber, Waiting for Watergate: The Long Road to FEe Reform, 79 S. CAL. L. REv.
1155, 1158 (2006).
218. N.Y. Times CO. V. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
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actual corruption and avoid the appearance of corruption by exposing
large ... expenditures to the light of publicity.,,219 Disclosure educates
voters 220 and prevents circumvention of other aspects of the federal
election laws. 221 The Court has gone so far as to characterize the
disclosure provisions as constitutionally moored-"a reasonable and
minimally restrictive method of furthering First Amendment values.,,222
Moreover, disclosure may occupy a uniquely useful role in election
and campaign finance regulation and in deterring would-be violators.
Although the FEC's critics disagree over the nature and source of the
enforcement problem, two points seem uncontroversial. First, the current
regulatory enforcement scheme-which relies upon relatively trivial and
untimely administrative or civil fines-is ineffective and, second, the
reasons for its ineffectiveness include one that is intractable: First
Amendment limitations on enjoining pre-election political speech. 223
Some have therefore suggested that "an emphasis on disclosure and
enforcement by 'information'" is a uniquely viable solution to the
problem.224 If third-party complaints do, in fact, disproportionately raise
disclosure violations, third-party enforcement would enhance the
agency's ability to effectively carry out a core aspect of its mission. 225
As for the overenforcement critique of the FEC, vigorous standing
challenges by the Commission are an inapposite fix. The FEC is
simultaneously assailed for weak enforcement and for "look[ing]
219. Buckley v. Val eo, 424 U.S. 1,67 (1976).
220. See Nichol, supra note 59, at 334 ("Other rulings" by the Supreme Court "have [also] ...
been thought to bolster democratic participation rather than to thwart it," e.g., "it makes little sense
to say that traditional victims of discrimination or those who have been effectively shut out of
democratic processes ought to be relegated to asserting their most fundamental rights only through
electoral politics. ").
221. See FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 155 (2003) (discussing regulation of corporate
electoral involvement and use of organizations as conduits for circumvention of contribution limits);
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67-68 (stating that disclosure requirements are an essential means of gathering
data necessary to detect contribution limit violations and the evils of campaign corruption).
222. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 82; see also, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,
792 n.32 (1978) (discussing that identification of the source of advertising may be required). But
here again, there is legitimate debate. Although disclosure informs voters, it comes at the cost of
hindering anonymous political speech. Smith, supra note 203, at 361-62 (citing Mcintyre v. Ohio
Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995)).
223. See, e.g., Bradley A. Smith, McConnell v. Federal Election Commission: Ideology Trumps
Reality, Pragmatism, 3 ELECTION L.J. 345, 350-51 (discussing the tension between the "appearance
of corruption" rationale for legislation limiting political speech and the infringements on First
Amendment rights).
224. Lochner & Cain, supra note 207, at 1892, 1935-36.
225. Citizen standing to obtain judicial review of the Commission's nonenforcement decisions
also serves to counteract perceived political bias on the part of the FEC in its enforcement process.
See id. at 1894 (explaining that many critics of the FEC suggest that the FEC fails in its enforcement
because it is biased toward the party controlling Congress).
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everywhere" to expand the scope of its investigations to capture bit
players. 226 Small grassroots organizations lack the expertise and capital
to readily comply with the FECA's onerous disclosure provisions and
may be disproportionately "chill[ed]" in their legal activities for fear of
FEC scrutiny.227 But the limited research that exists does not suggest
that the citizen-suit provision worsens the problems identified with
FECA enforcement. Although the FECA's citizen-suit provision reflects
an unambiguous legislative objective to shift some measure of power and
control over its enforcement to private citizens via access to the
judiciary, it impacts a narrow range of cases and is poised only to
marginally disturb the agency's prerogative to enforce the law. As a test
case for considering the relative merits of the private and public law
models of adjudication, therefore, Congress's circumscribed mechanism
for ensuring that the FEC does not shirk its enforcement responsibilities
comfortably warrants the Court's constitutional approval in Akins.
IV. TOWARD A NEW JUSTICIABILITY PARADIGM: FECA STANDING AND
BEYOND
With the specter of excessive judicial interference under § 437g(a)(8)
dispelled, this Part attempts to reconcile Lujan and Akins and the
polarized theories of adjudication at play. Courts should, as a matter of
sound justiciability jurisprudence, honor congressional intent and Akins's
clear holding by affording information-seeking plaintiffs standing per se
Although the broader
under the FECA's citizen-suit provision.
implications of Akins have not been fully realized, this Part attempts to
justify modest expansion of its premises.
Despite the rigidity of Lujan's injury-in-fact test, the Supreme Court
has already retracted from the causation and redressability requirements
in cases implicating the enforcement of public rights. As this Part
observes, this doctrinal development is sensible. Because the standards
for substantive review of the Executive's nonenforcement decisions are
deferential, the separation-of-powers concerns underlying the private law
model of adjudication are satisfied at the merits stage of the litigation in
226. Smith, supra note 203, at 356-57.
227. Jd. Although this Article proposes that courts adopt a FOIA-like perspective that would
treat FECA citizen-suit standing as virtually automatic, whether citizen standing should be expanded
to capture overenforcement practices or whether it exacerbates the perceived intimidation of small
groups as it stands is another matter. Further research is necessary to determine empirically whether
meritless complaints against tangential violators, dismissed by the FEC, end up in citizen-suit
litigation to an unacceptable degree or, more importantly, whether the threat of litigation worsens the
effects of enforcement on remote actors engaging in legitimate activities.
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FECA cases. An Akins approach to standing that focuses on statutory
injury without requiring strict causation and redressability would create
incentives for agency compliance with the law by affording more merits
scrutiny.
A. Per Se FECA Standing and the Emerging Irrelevance of Causation
and Redressability
As described in Part II, Akins collides with Lujan on causation and
redressability when the facts are such that it appears "entirely conjectural
whether the nonagency activity that affects [plaintiffs] will be altered or
affected by the agency activity they seek to achieve.,,228 These words,
authored by Justice Scalia, articulate a standard that would render
standing virtually impossible to satisfy in cases involving something
other than direct regulation of the plaintiff, such as, for example, the
denial of a pollution permit. In Akins, it was "entirely conjectural"
whether AlP AC would produce information in response to the
hypothetical FEC enforcement action the plaintiffs sought. For that
matter, it was conjectural whether the FEC would order AlP AC to tum
over the information after investigating the allegations on remand. Yet a
majority of the Court found standing. In public law cases brought to
enforce a "right" or to "right a wrong" that is undifferentiated amongst
the public, Akins renders the Lujan formulation of causation and
redressability obsolete.
Accordingly, in informational cases under Akins, a lack of
information that must be disclosed under the statute should be per se
sufficient injury, much as it is well-established that "[a] person seeking
information under the FOIA ... need not have a personal stake in the
information sought" to bring suit. 229 The filing of a FOIA request and its
denial is sufficient "harm" to distinguish the plaintiff from the general
populace for Article III purposes.230 Under Lujan, one could argue that
228. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 571 (1992) (plurality opinion).
229. McDonnell v. United States, 4 F.3d 1227, 1237-38 (3d Cir. 1993).
230. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166,204 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (citing 5
U.S.C. § 552(a)(3»; McDonnell, 4 F.3d at 1238. The Supreme Court has long recognized that no
showing of need for specific information is necessary to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts
as a matter of constitutional law. It is well-established that even though a FOIA plaintiff's injury-a
lack of information-is shared generally, the generalized nature of that grievance is not a
constitutional barrier to standing. Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440,449 (1989)
(citing U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749 (1989);
U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Julian, 486 U.S. I (1988); United States v. Weber Aircraft Corp., 465 U.S.
792 (1984); FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615 (1982); Dep't of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352
(1976».
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the absence of information sought by a FOIA request, without more, is
too generalized and lacking in particularity to be cognizable, and that
many FOIA requesters' transparent aim to pry into the workings of the
government and bring lawsuits to impact administrative enforcement
activity dispels any notion of legitimate need?3' But the horribles
expected to flow from an overbearing judiciary in the citizen-suit arena
have not occurred with FOIA litigation.
Aside from delays in
administrative processing, the statute seems to work; one searches in
vain for lower-court decisions addressing standing to bring a FOIA case.
Once in court, the cases go right to the merits, without long and
expensive preliminary litigation to divine injury within the meaning of
conflicting Supreme Court case law. Indeed, FECA litigation gives
credence to the notion that if standing hearings were routine in the FOIA
context, "[a]gencies reluctant to disclose information would have a
powerful incentive both to stall and to find that the requester does not
have standing. ,,232
The Supreme Court found "no reason for a different rule" under the
Federal Advisory Commission Act (FACA),m which stipulates that
minutes, records, and reports of Executive Branch advisory committees
be made available to the public, so long as they do not fall within one of
the FOIA's disclosure exemptions.234 In a challenge by a public interest
group to the Department of Justice's refusal to divulge the names of
potential judicial nominees submitted to a committee of the American
Bar Association, the Court rejected the argument that a plaintiffs
attempt to seek access to such information was a nonjusticiable "general
grievance," citing the FOIA as authority.235
Like the FOIA and the FACA, which "specifically provide for and
are intended to promote 'disclosure and public access' to the workings of
government and a policy of 'government in the sunshine,,,,236 the FECA
promotes the goals of disclosure and public access that justified the

231. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: Standing as a Judicially Imposed
Limit on Legislative Power, 42 DUKE L.J. 1170, 1189 (1993) ("Perhaps [the] interest is derivative of
the general public's interest in knowing what the government is doing. If so, that would seem to be
an 'undifferentiated public interest' that Congress cannot convert 'into an "individual right"
vindicable in the courts.'" (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577)).
232. Id. at 1190; see also Mark Tushnet, "Meet the New Boss ": The New Judicial Center, 83
N.C. L. REv. 1205, 1213-14 n.40 (2005) (observing that the "impairment of public access" to
information as an injury sufficient to confer standing in the ordinary FOIA case goes unquestioned).
233. Pub. Citizen, 491 U.S. at 449.
234. 5 U.S.c. app. § lO(a)(2), (d) (2000).
235. Pub. Citizen, 491 U.S. at 448-50.
236. Am. Farm Bureau v. U.S. EPA, 121 F. Supp. 2d 84, 98 (D.D.C. 2000).
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Supreme Court's straightforward standing jurisprudence elsewhere. 237 If
voters have more complete information under the FECA, and their votes
are in fact influenced by information regarding the source of a
candidate's money or how it is spent, candidates may become mindful of
compliance in a way that they are not now, precisely because the
outcome of the election-rather than modest after-the-fact fines-could
be affected. 238 If candidates know who is funding their opponents, they
also can more fairly respond.
Resolution of standing disputes in cases seeking election-related
information under the FECA's citizen-suit provision should, like FOIA
and FECA cases, be facile and uncontroversial. Courts should deny
motions to dismiss for lack of standing in such cases sua sponte and
order the FEC to pay the plaintiff's fees and costs. The frontier of
standing litigation in public law cases could then properly shift to
whether to apply Akins in lieu of Lujan in noninformational citizen suits,
not whether Akins applies at all. 239
But what, then, is left of Lujan standing in cases brought under
citizen-suit statutes if Akins is taken to its logical extreme? Congress's
ability to create a justiciable "right" to information does not mean that
any government activity is open to judicial scrutiny on the theory that it
informs voters. Akins did not overrule the separation of powers principle
that courts are not constitutionally authorized to second-guess policy
decisions by the elected branches. On this question, Justice Kennedy's
concurrence in Lujan is revealing. In accepting the controversial
proposition that Congress does have the power to define novel injuries
that will give rise to a case or controversy, he observed that, "[i]n
exercising this power . . . Congress must at the very least identify the
injury it seeks to vindicate and relate the injury to the class of persons

237. See supra notes 229-36 and accompanying text (discussing FOIA and FACA standing).
238. Whether the election and campaign finance laws in fact operate to make the system more
fair is another debater's point that is outside the scope of this Article. Cj Bradley A. Smith,
Campaign Finance Reform: Searching for Corruption in All the Wrong Places, 2002-2003 CATO
SUP. CT. REv. 187, 197-201 (2003) (challenging the assumption that limitations on campaign
contributions inhibit corruption).
239. There is a large body of standing law and scholarship that has developed with respect to
environmental litigation in particular. See generally, e.g., Adrienne Smith, Standing and the
National Environmental Policy Act: Where Substance, Procedure, and Information Collide, 85 B.U.
L. REv. 633, 653-62 (2005) (arguing that standing law should allow plaintiffs to sue under NEPA on
an informational theory). This Article does not address the application of Akins to environmental
cases, although the majority of citizen-suit statutes do appear in that context. See supra note 33.
The thesis of this Article is, rather, that Akins should be brought to the forefront of standing litigation
in analogous circumstances instead of dismissing it as confined to voter suits for information under
the FECA.
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entitled to bring suit.,,24o He deemed the ESA insufficient, because it did
not establish that there is an injury by virtue of a violation. 241 Although
Akins reconfigured standing law in cases implicating so-called
generalized grievances, the plaintiffs lack of election-related
information sets that case apart from the citizen suit challenging
government action on ideological grounds. But the Akins Court provided
no guidance on where to draw the line between ideology and cognizable
injury where the injury is widely shared. As a consequence, the scope of
standing to sue under statutes that authorize the public to vindicate more
abstract procedural injuries-such as the right to interagency
consultation at issue in Lujan-remains ambiguous.
A statute that expressly draws the connection Justice Kennedy found
lacking-the easiest case-should, like the FECA, trigger standing per
se, or at least a presumption of standing that can only be rebutted with a
clear showing of contrary congressional intent. But poorly worded
legislation that invites lawyers to spin "injuries" from creative
application of the myriad canons of statutory construction should be
viewed with a jaundiced eye. After Akins, which turned primarily-if
not exclusively-on the identification of statutory injury, the injury-infact prong of the Lujan test remains central in statutory standing cases,
and must be carefully construed.
Causation and redressability is another matter. Although Lujan and
its progeny conceive of all three prongs as equally vigorous under Article
III, the Supreme Court has treated causation and redressability as
dispensible in other public law cases, raising the question of whether
they are meaningful in that context at all. In Utah v. Evans/ 42 the Court
found that Utah had standing to challenge the legality of the 2000 Census
counting method that caused it to lose a congressional representative. 243
A recount would have required the Secretary of Commerce to issue a
new set of numbers, the President to accept them, and the issuance of a
new reapportionment statement to Congress?44 Pronouncing that "[w]e
read limitations on our jurisdiction to review narrowly," the Court found
the alleged injury redressable because "[v ]ictory would mean a
declaration leading, or an injunction requiring, the Secretary [of
Commerce] to substitute a new 'report' for an old one," which in tum

240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id.
536 U.S. 452 (2002).
Id. at 459-61.
See id. at 463 (declaring that a Utah victory would require a new census report).
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could lead to mechanical recalculations related to apportionment. 245
Thus, "the courts would have ordered a change in a legal status (that of
the 'report'), and the practical consequence of that change would amount
to a significant increase in the likelihood that the plaintiff would obtain
relief that directly redresses the injury suffered.,,246 The Court cited
Akins as an example of its having "found standing in similar
circumstances.,,247
Justice Scalia again dissented, charging the majority with committing
"a flagrant violation of the separation of powers,,248 because redress
depends on exercise of the President's discretion as well as that of "a
majority of 435 Representatives and 100 Senators . . . whom federal
courts are equally powerless to order to take official acts.,,249 Redress in
Akins, he further reasoned, did not require action by a third party who
could not be brought before a federal court and "for whom (as for the
President) it would be disrespectful for us to presume a course of
action.,,25o This awkward attempt to bring Akins within the Lujan
framework only underscores their cases' incompatability, as
redressability has never turned on whether the third party is or is not
coercible or whether it "displays a gross disrespect" for courts to assume
that it is.
The Evans Court's cavalier redressability analysis
demonstrates that, despite the perceived historical roots of a strict test for
individualized injury, the Supreme Court has begun to recognize that
Lujan does not readily fit every standing case.
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOe),
251
Inc.
is another striking example of a disintegrating redressability
standard. In that case, the Court upheld environmental groups' statutory
standing to bring suit against the holder of a pollution permit under the
citizen-suit provision of the Clean Water Act (CWAi 52 based on the
"quantum of deterrence" that the statute's civil penalties create, casting
doubt on the vitality of the second and third prongs of the Lujan
analysis.253 The Court concluded that, "[t]o the extent [civil penalties]

245. Id.
246. [d. at 464 (emphasis added).
247. !d.
248. [d. at 514 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
249. [d. at 511-12.
250. Id. at 514.
251. 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
252. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (2000).
253. 528 U.S. at 187-88. Unlike Akins, Laidlaw has been the subject of significant academic
commentary that I will not attempt to summarize here except to note that it is a particularly
important counterpoint to Lujan because both cases involved environmental citizen-suit statutes. See
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encourage defendants to discontinue current violations and deter them
from committing future ones, the afford redress to citizen plaintiffs.,,254
Recognizing the implications of such a trajectory for standing
jurisprudence, Justice Scalia called the Court's weakened application of
injury-in-fact in Laidlaw "a lever that will move the world,,,255 as it
"come[s] close to 'mak[ing] the redressability requirement vanish'" and
"place[s] the immense power of suing to enforce the public laws in
private hands.,,256 He charged in dissent that the Court's allowance of
citizen suits for civil penalties under the CWA "has grave implications
for democratic governance," and he challenged a standing model that
would apply the redressability requirement merely to ensure that the
plaintiff received some tangential benefit from a favorable judgment. 257
A similar watering-down of Lujan standing-and a consequent shift
towards an analysis of congressional intent in the public law contexthas appeared in lower-court decisions. In Hodges v. Abraham,258 for
example, the Fourth Circuit blithely held that NEPA plaintiffs possess a
procedural right to have the Executive observe procedures mandated by
law "without meeting all the normal standards for redressability and
immediacy.,,259 In Ethyl Corp. v. EPA,26o a court found that a
manufacturer of fuel additives had standing to sue the EPA to enforce the
Clean Air Act's requirement of an "open procedure" for conducting
environmental tests on an Akins-type injury theory. 261 The plaintiff
successfully argued that the information sought "might well help it
develop and improve its products with an eye to conformity to emissions
needs,,,262 and the court remanded the case with directions that the
agency essentially abide by the statute and establish test methods and
procedures. 263 Recently, a U.S. district court in California found
generally Citizen Suits and the Future of Standing in the 21st Century: From Lujan to Laidlaw and
Beyond, II & 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'y F. (SPECIAL DOUBLE ISSUE) (2001).
254. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 186 (emphasis added).
255. Id. at 205 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
256. Id. at 215 (alteration in original) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S.
83, 107 (1998».
257. Id. at 202. The Court observed that the "federal Executive Branch does not share the
dissent's view that such suits dissipate its authority to enforce the law," as "the Department of
Justice has endorsed this citizen suit from the outset" in amicus briefs and that "the Federal
Government retains the power to foreclose a citizen suit by undertaking its own action." Id. at 188
n.4 (majority opinion).
258. 300 F.3d 432 (4th Cir. 2002).
259. Id. at 444 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992».
260. 306 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
261. /d. at 1147-48, 1150.
262. Id. at 1147.
263. Id. at 1150.
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justiciable a suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act that
challenged barriers to access that the plaintiff did not suffer himself.264
The court found standing based on an expert witness's inspection of the
store in question during discovery on the theory that "Congress . . .
stat[ ed] that the purpose of the Act was to create a 'mandate for the
elimination of discrimination' not just the weakening or reduction of
discrimination which is what the case would be if plaintiffs were only
allowed to bring suit for barriers that absolutely denied access.,,265 The
court dismissed causation and redressability concerns in a footnote as not
having "been raised" and not "reasonably" worth raising. 266
In part because the train has already left the station in terms of
recognizing statutory standing in cases involving something less than
redressable particularized injury, a forthright recasting of the Lujan
standard in public law cases is becoming increasingly necessary. As the
FEC has specifically argued in attempting to dispel the obvious reach of
Akins, Lujan is so entrenched in the psyche of justiciability jurisprudence
that it seems "radical" to challenge it at all. 267 Courts should, however,
as a threshold matter read Akins as expressly disavowing the causation
and redressability prongs of the traditional test for administrative cases,
where they have little content, and look primarily to whether Congress
created a nonabstract "injury"-by, for example, conferring a right to
information-within the meaning of Akins. 268
After all, agencies on remand are not constrained to a particular
substantive outcome. In revisiting the facts and the law under judicial
guidelines, an agency may arrive at a perfectly lawful decision that
leaves the initial injury unredressed. Courts have therefore recognized
that causation is satisfied "when a plaintiff demonstrates that the
challenged agency action authorizes the conduct that allegedly caused
the plaintiffs injuries, if that conduct would allegedly be illegal
otherwise.,,269 In cases involving regulation of a third party, Lujan
causation is almost never present because the link between the

264. Wilson v. Pier I Imports (US), Inc., 413 F. Supp. 2d 1130,1135 (E.D. Cal. 2006).
265. [d. at 1133 (quoting 42 U.S.c. § 12101(b)(I) (2000)). The court also discussed the split
among district courts on this issue. [d. at 1132-35.
266. [d. at 1132 n.3.
267. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
268. See Wyo. Outdoor Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 165 FJd 43, 51 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
(indicating that in procedural rights cases the "necessary showing" supporting the "constitutional
minima of injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability ... is reduced").
269. See Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Glickman, 154 FJd 426, 440 (D.C. CiT. 1998) (en
banc) (emphasis added) (upholding standing in facial challenge to regulations allegedly authorizing
statutorily proscribed inhumane treatment of animals).
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government activity and the claimed injury is necessarily tenuous insofar
as it is contingent on nonparties' behavior. Akins fully embraced this
inevitability.
The rise of the administrative state no doubt contributes to the LujanAkins dilemma over causation and redressability, because it naturally
occasions an increase in litigation to enforce public values. In his Lujan
concurrence, Justice Kennedy observed that as "Government programs
and policies become more complex and farreaching, . . . [m]odern
litigation has progressed far from the paradigm of Marbury suing
Madison to get his commission.,,27o Increased legislation and the
expansion of the powers of the Executive Branch naturally prompt
litigation to enforce statutory mandates. 271 Such litigation is arguably the
very litigation to enforce public values that Lujan rejects. But it is also
unavoidable, which is perhaps why-notwithstanding Lujan---courts
have not strictly applied the causation and redressability requirements in
a number of administrative cases.272
Akins represents a more modern conception of standing that is
attuned to the realities of administrative litigation. The injury-in-fact test
was designed to restrict individuals' ability to sue to enforce the legal
duties of agencies with greatly augmented powers. Given the nature of
common law claims, it is unsurprising that the test is apt to favor the
regulated-who are readily able to demonstrate particularized injuryover the individual who as a member of the public is a beneficiary of the
law.273 The position that statutory beneficiaries have standing to sue to
implement a law only if they too can demonstrate injury that is direct and
particularized and thus akin to that suffered by a regulated party is
suspect. If one accepts the constitutionality of the delegation of

270. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803».
271. See Sunstein, supra note 5, at 179 (explaining that the current standing doctrine developed
"as part and parcel of the heated struggle, in the 1920s and the 1930s, within the country and the
courts about the constitutional legitimacy of the emerging regulatory state").
272. In a remarkable footnote, Justice Scalia conceded in Lujan that "one living adjacent to the
site for proposed construction of a federally licensed dam has standing to challenge the licensing
agency's failure to prepare an environmental impact statement, even though he cannot establish with
any certainty that the statement will cause the license to be withheld or altered" but that people
living at the other end of the country would not. 504 U.S. at 572 n.7. Even under Lujan itself,
therefore, the causation and redressability requirements wiggle.
273. The test has been challenged as having a disproportionately negative impact on the poor
and disenfranchised. See, e.g., Nichol, supra note 59, at 333 ("Anomalously, the power to trigger
judicial review is afforded most readily to those who have traditionally enjoyed the greatest access to
the processes of democratic government. ... Minority plaintiffs, poor litigants, unwed mothers,
black prisoners, and indigent patients get the harshest treatment in injury law.").
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Executive power to agencies,274 the realities of the administrative state
require a more practical standing analysis in citizen suits against the
federal government.
While the permutations of extending Akins's premises to other
citizen-suit statutes can only be revealed slowly through lower-court
decisions, judicial acknowledgement that Akins repudiated Lujan and
established injury per se in cases seeking information under the FECA is
an important first step in bringing order to this dizzying area of the law,
and may be inevitable as a natural consequence of the expansion of the
modern administrative state. Rather than purporting to apply Lujan in a
context where it does not fit, courts should distinguish Lujan and adopt
an approach that squarely acknowledges that the public law model of
adjudication has a legitimate place in public law litigation.

B. Administrative Litigation and Substantive Review: Two Bites at the
Article II Apple?
The foregoing subpart attempts to make the case for treating FECA
plaintiffs seeking election-related information as establishing standing
per se, and for recognizing that Akins and later cases have marginalized
the causation and redressability requirements in such a way as to render
them less meaningful in broader public law contexts.
The
counterargument that would denounce increased access to the courtsand urge reversion to Lujan in FECA cases-is really about Article II,
not Article III. The Take Care Clause grants the President the exclusive
authority to "faithfully execute[]" federal law as enacted 275 As Professor
Sunstein has observed, "[i]t is for this reason that the standard
administrative law case raises no issue under the Take Care Clause. If an
object of regulation establishes that an agency has enforced the law in an
unlawful way, the President has violated his duty under the Take Care
Clause.,,276 Courts can constitutionally adjudicate such a dispute.
Although the Supreme Court has already established that a citizen cannot
invoke the judiciary to compel most agency enforcement activity,277
standing to sue an agency should not be construed in a way that nullifies
congressional directives and leaves the Executive Branch free to
disregard the law.

274.
275.
276.
277.

See TRIBE, supra note 81, at 131 (discussing constitutionality of the administrative state).
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
Sunstein, supra note 5, at 212.
See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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The separation-of-powers concerns underlying Lujan, although
legitimate, are addressed elsewhere in the administrative review process.
Plaintiffs suing a federal government agency under the generic review
provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)278 must, of
course, satisfy Article III standing in every case. Those who can
demonstrate injury-in-fact sufficient to distinguish themselves from
someone who sues as the people's representative avenging a so-called
"generalized grievance" find themselves faced with very deferential
substantive standards for obtaining review of agency inaction under the
AP A. A bald claim that the agency is not doing its job will survive
neither a motion to dismiss for lack of standing nor a motion for
summary judgment on the merits for substantially similar reasons. As a
consequence, the relationship between standing to sue a federal agency
for vindication of procedural rights and the standards for securing
substantive review of agency action support an interpretation of Akins
that enables interested parties to bring challenges to government
nonenforcement decisions under an appropriately worded citizen-suit
statute, while continuing to afford agencies the deference they already
enjoy under the APA.
The Supreme Court's APA jurisprudence reflects movement from a
default standard of reviewability279 toward one of unreviewability in
cases involving agency refusals to enforce. The Court held in Heckler v.
Chanei 80 that if Congress has not established standards for review of
agency activity, the courts are without jurisdiction to review the action
for the same reasons that a court, applying Lujan, could dismiss on
standing grounds: arbitrariness challenges to the Executive are for the
political branches, not the courtS. 281 In Norton v. Southern Utah
Wilderness Alliance,282 the Court deemed agency inactivity largely
unreviewable under § 706(1) of the AP A, which sets forth a cause of
action to "compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably
delayed,,,283 because courts can only compel agencies to take discrete

278. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (2000).
279. See Steenholdt v. FAA, 314 F.3d 633, 638 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citing Abbott Labs. v.
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967)) (setting forth general rule of reviewability under the APA);
Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 911 F.2d 1405, 1410 (10th CiT. 1990) (citing Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 140)
("As a general matter, all agency action is presumed reviewable.").
280. 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
281. See id. at 830-32 (holding that agency decisions regarding whether to take enforcement
action are presumptively unreviewable, because there is "no law to apply" under the "committed to
agency discretion" exception to APA review).
282. 542 U.S. 55 (2004).
283. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1).
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actions under the AP A; broad programmatic attacks on agency action are
for the political process to resolve. 284 For its part, the FECA provides no
mechanism by which a third party may obtain judicial review of the
FEC's enforcement decisions after an investigation has been
conducted?85 All that can be achieved by invoking the citizen-suit
provision is an order requiring the agency to take the next investigative
step?86
Although the FECA' s private right of action does impinge on agency
discretion to direct resources away from the investigative process in
certain cases, because of the statute's limited scope, the argument for
rigorous standing analyses in § 437g(a)(8) suits is not compelling. More
pragmatic are the implications of a per se informational standing analysis
under Akins. A careful look at the D.C. Circuit's opinion in CREW v.
FEC 8? is illustrative. Although the complaint was ultimately dismissed
for lack of standing, the holding turned in part on the court's notation
that that CREW "agree[d] with the Commission's reason-to-believe
determinations and expresse[d] satisfaction that it received 'a publicly
disclosed ruling that the administrative respondents violated the law. ",288
In other words, Judge Randolph wrote, "we do not know what legal
principle CREW thinks the Commission . . . violated.,,289 Or as the
district court put it, "CREW has received all or more than it is due under
FECA," including the FEC's assessment of the list's value (zero), and
that there was no requirement under the FECA that "the FEC ... value
an in-kind contribution in the form of a contact list.,,290 Thus, the court
dismissed the complaint in part because CREW's claim on the merits
was fatally flawed. The FEC's exercise of its prosecutorial discretion in
284. Norton, 542 U.S. at 64. See generally Bressman, supra note 59 (discussing arbitrariness
approach to judicial review of agency inaction).
285. See Perot v. FEC, 97 F.3d 553, 558 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("Apart from § 437g(a)(8)(C),
there is no private right of action to enforce FECA against an alleged violator."); cf Republican
Nat' I Comm. v. FEC, 76 F.3d 400, 404 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (applying Chevron deference to FEC
regulation).
286. Under § 437g(a)(8)(c), the complainant may bring a civil action to remedy the violation
alleged in the original complaint if the Commission fails to conform to the district court's
declaration that the dismissal of the administrative complaint was contrary to law. 2 U.S.C. §
437g(a)(8)(C) (2000). The district court reviews the propriety of the dismissal under a deferential
standard that considers whether the FEC's construction of a statute is sufficiently reasonable to be
accepted by a reviewing court. FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 37,
39 (1981).
287. 475 F.3d 337 (D.C. Cir. 2007); see also supra notes 124-42 and accompanying text
(discussing the facts and holding of CREW).
288. CREW, 475 F.3d at 340 (quoting Br. for Appellant 22).
289. ld.
290. Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. [CREW] v. FEC, 401 F. Supp. 2d 115, 121
n.2 (D.D.C. 2005), affd, 475 F.3d 337.
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letting this violation go, although politically troublesome to CREW, was
not unlawful. Moreover, unlike in Kean, the FEC had undertaken the
investigation on its own accord, which resulted in the disclosure of a
great deal of information to the public, including the fact "that an illegal
in-kind contribution took place," "that the in-kind contribution was a
master contact list containing the names and contact information of
conservative activists," "that the list's monetary value [was] negligible,"
and "the identities of the individuals and campaign involved in the illegal
transaction. ,,291
Had the FEC refused to conduct the initial investigation, however,
none of this information would have been made public. Under an
informational standing analysis identical to that undertaken by the D.C.
Circuit,292 it would have lacked jurisdiction to review a complaint by
CREW challenging the dismissal of the administrative complaint
preinvestigation on causation and redresssability grounds. Such a ruling
would clearly be incorrect under Akins. Ultimately, perhaps, the court's
decision to deny standing had much to do with the fact that the FEC had
satisfied its legal obligations and CREW had obtained all the information
it reasonably needed. Had the court applied Akins to find standing and
resolved the claim on the merits, the standing analysis would be less
prone to the subjective manipulation Lujan critics decry.293
Yet Article III should not be interpreted so flexibly that courts are
thrust into the center of the political arena. The limited role of the
judiciary in our system of government forecloses a justiciability doctrine
that would render cognizable all generalized claims seeking intangible
public benefits, a scenario that would undermine-if not eliminate-the
separation of powers. Some inquiry is necessary to ascertain whether
this plaintiff is mired in a case or controversy against the government
that warrants judicial attention. Although the injury-in-fact test has
served the crude function of narrowing the range of litigants-thus the
kinds of public law cases-that federal courts adjudicate, its purported
intolerance for any judicial review to enforce public values is simply out
of step with the realities of modem administrative law, and is not
explicitly mandated by Article III in any event. It dramatizes Article II
concerns that are separately addressed in the review provisions under the
APA, as construed by the Supreme Court. 294
291. Id. at 121.
292. See supra notes 124-37.
293. Cf Fletcher, supra note 62, at 223 (arguing that "standing should simply be a question on
the merits of plaintiff's claim").
294. See supra note 278 and accompanying text (discussing judicial interpretation of the APA).
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To be sure, Akins and Lujan crossed swords on the basic question of
congressional power to confer standing by defining an interest-and
conversely, an injury-by statute. Justice Scalia deemed it "obvious" in
Lujan that
[t]o permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated public interest in
executive officers' compliance with the law into an "individual right"
vindicable in the courts is to permit Congress to transfer from the
President to the courts the Chief Executive's most important
constitutional duty, to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed. ,,295

But citizen-suit statutes such as the FECA, along with the APA,296 each
represent a determination by Congress to enhance a particular public
value, and thus a collective public acceptance of the interest the
legislation protects. 297 The FECA' s judicial review provisions similarly
manifest congressional choice regarding the best way to implement a
statute and ensure agency accountability for failure to enforce the
FECA's disclosure requirements. An elected Congress may better
represent democratic will than agency heads and administrators who are
politically accountable only indirectly (through the control of an elected
President). Its citizen-suit legislation by its very nature contemplates
separation-of-powers concerns. Standing notwithstanding, the modest
infringement of agency discretion under the FECA's citizen-suit
provision does not justify its nullification on separation-of-powers
grounds under the auspices of Article III justiciability.
V. CONCLUSION

A test for Article III standing devoid of arbitrariness is an oxymoron.
But arbitrariness is not confusion and obfuscation. The Akins Court's
failure to make clear that it was departing from Lujan in its analysis of
causation and redressability has made it difficult for citizen-standing
jurisprudence to develop with clarity and direction. Whether Akins is the
better view depends in part on whether other checks on overzealous
judicial review of Executive action suffice. The myriad critiques of the
FEC and the circumscribed applicability of the FECA's citizen-suit
provision suggest that Congress acted reasonably in determining that
295. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3).
296. 5 U.S.c. §§ 701-706 (2000).
297. See Nichol, supra note 20, at 1947 ("Legislative enactment reflects shared acceptance of
the interest and typically alleviates any concern over separation of powers.").
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there is a role for the judiciary in ensuring the statute's enforcement.
That role must be carefully circumscribed, but the congressional
determination that Executive checks on unelected agency officials'
conduct do not suffice to ensure implementation of the law in certain
contexts is not expressly prohibited by the Constitution. The question
remaining is how far is too far in evaluating Congress's exercise of its
authority to legislate standing and what criteria should inform the
answer.
As a first step, this Article seeks to recapture Akins's main
contribution to standing jurisprudence, which is often lost. Akins,
properly construed, sets forth a rule of law that is refreshingly resistant to
line-drawing. The lack of subjectivity is what most distinguishes Akins's
standard for informational injury from Lujan's injury-in-fact test. 298
Akins also dilutes particularized injury, causation and redressability in
ways that cut across many administrative actions. If Congress creates a
right to information, plaintiffs can sue an agency to obtain that
information, even if the citizenry at large shares the plaintiff s injury and
even if ultimate redress depends both on the exercise of agency
discretion and the actions of third parties that are not named in the
lawsuit. Courts should squarely apply Akins to FECA cases seeking
information and take steps to dissuade the FEC from pursuing a strategy
of challenging Akins standing under all circumstances.
Because the merits of administrative challenges to Executive refusals
to enforce are governed by highly deferential standards of review, the
separation-of-powers concerns underlying the Lujan test are adequately
addressed by the more forgiving Akins inquiry in citizen-suit cases
brought to prompt enforcement action. Its proper application would
avoid cumbersome litigation over particularized injury-litigation that
can keep worthy plaintiffs from having their day in court based on
idiosyncratic factual analysis-while protecting against citizen lawsuits
that attempt to second-guess Executive activity in contravention of
Article II.

298. See Nichol, supra note 59, at 316-22 (discussing problems with the Lujan standard).

